2002
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.2002.0007
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Failed Democratic Transition in Cameroon: A Human Rights Explanation

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Cited by 34 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…47 More specifically concerning Cameroon, Dicklitch hits the nail on the head by arguing that '[t]he French have been willing to support the Biya regime in order to maintain political and economic stability as well as continued French influence and access to Cameroonian natural resources'. 48 Cameroon's President Paul Biya, a reluctant reformer to say the least, certainly more than benefited from France's help, and clearly maintained power because of it. Even significant human rights abuses and blatant electoral fraud could not deter the African regime's backers in Paris.…”
Section: Democratizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…47 More specifically concerning Cameroon, Dicklitch hits the nail on the head by arguing that '[t]he French have been willing to support the Biya regime in order to maintain political and economic stability as well as continued French influence and access to Cameroonian natural resources'. 48 Cameroon's President Paul Biya, a reluctant reformer to say the least, certainly more than benefited from France's help, and clearly maintained power because of it. Even significant human rights abuses and blatant electoral fraud could not deter the African regime's backers in Paris.…”
Section: Democratizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Biya’s hand played out, the second half of 1991 would go to the advantage of the regime. According to Susan Dicklitch (2002: 171) ‘[t]he campaign of civil disobedience ended in mid-October 1991 following government repression and detention of opposition members and protestors.’ Paul Biya at this time looked to consolidate his position in his speech to Cameroonian people on 11 October 1991. In this declaration Biya announced the conveying of the Yaoundé Tripatite Meeting to discuss a limited number of issues, such as access to the media for political parties and changes to the electoral code.…”
Section: Part I: Cameroon In the Early 1990smentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Together the CPDM and MDR formed a narrow majority coalition by only four seats (94 of 180 seats or 52.2%). To cement the deal between the two parties, Biya used patronage to win over the support of key individuals, offering ministerial posts to their partners in the coalition (Dicklitch, 2002: 165). In handing out these favors, Biya was forced to dramatically increase the size of his executive cabinet, from 25 seats to 37.…”
Section: Part I: Cameroon In the Early 1990smentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Jeidoh Duni and Robert Fon are, respectively, the paralegal coordinator and the lawyer on the programme discussed here; Nuhu Salihu is Africa Programme Coordinator for Village AiD, the funder-partner in the programme, and Sam Hickey was a trustee of Village AiD at the time the research was carried out. human rights (Dicklitch 2002). The national institutions required to guarantee these rights have yet to be established, leaving arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudiciary execution of civilians, imprisonment of journalists, torture and corruption commonplace (Amnesty International, 2003).…”
Section: Rights and Citizenship In Cameroon: The Politics Of Belongingmentioning
confidence: 99%