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Literature on the operation of regulatory agencies and their interactions with the executive branch of government is well established. Much less attention has been devoted to the relationship between these agencies and the courts, especially in case of judicial review of regulators’ decisions. This paper examines how judicial review of regulatory decisions produces clashes and agreements between regulatory agencies and the courts, and the influence of these relationships on regulatory governance. The research was conducted in Brazil with 21 interviews, consisting of eight officials of six federal regulatory agencies, seven attorneys from five agencies, and six federal judges. Regulatory governance, institutional theory, and regulatory overlap were the main analytical frameworks for this research. Data was subjected to content analysis. The findings showed that judicial review plays an important role in the overlapping scopes between courts and regulatory agencies. The institutional details of regulatory governance are crucial for the regulatory bodies to function. Despite the conflicts, judges seek more coordination with regulators, because of a greater awareness of the specifics of regulatory policies. Attorneys of regulatory bodies perform a key role in the dialogue between regulators and courts, especially by bridging the gap between technical and legal protocols. Regulatory litigation provides powerful economic agents with the opportunity to obtain a successful remittance of fines, thereby diluting the regulators’ ability to enforce regulation. Points for practitioners Judicial review is the only coordinating mechanism between regulatory agencies and the courts and plays a crucial role in defining regulatory policies and in controlling administrative behavior. In the process of judicial review, regulatory bodies confront the uncertainties that mark the blurred boundaries between the roles performed by state actors and authorities in dealing with regulation. By examining the Brazilian case, the research sheds light on regulatory governance and deals with the balance of power between the judiciary and formally independent regulatory bodies. The findings indicate the value of closer dialogue between regulators and courts in a context where regulatory agencies are increasingly called upon to make important technical and social choices on highly sensitive public issues.
Literature on the operation of regulatory agencies and their interactions with the executive branch of government is well established. Much less attention has been devoted to the relationship between these agencies and the courts, especially in case of judicial review of regulators’ decisions. This paper examines how judicial review of regulatory decisions produces clashes and agreements between regulatory agencies and the courts, and the influence of these relationships on regulatory governance. The research was conducted in Brazil with 21 interviews, consisting of eight officials of six federal regulatory agencies, seven attorneys from five agencies, and six federal judges. Regulatory governance, institutional theory, and regulatory overlap were the main analytical frameworks for this research. Data was subjected to content analysis. The findings showed that judicial review plays an important role in the overlapping scopes between courts and regulatory agencies. The institutional details of regulatory governance are crucial for the regulatory bodies to function. Despite the conflicts, judges seek more coordination with regulators, because of a greater awareness of the specifics of regulatory policies. Attorneys of regulatory bodies perform a key role in the dialogue between regulators and courts, especially by bridging the gap between technical and legal protocols. Regulatory litigation provides powerful economic agents with the opportunity to obtain a successful remittance of fines, thereby diluting the regulators’ ability to enforce regulation. Points for practitioners Judicial review is the only coordinating mechanism between regulatory agencies and the courts and plays a crucial role in defining regulatory policies and in controlling administrative behavior. In the process of judicial review, regulatory bodies confront the uncertainties that mark the blurred boundaries between the roles performed by state actors and authorities in dealing with regulation. By examining the Brazilian case, the research sheds light on regulatory governance and deals with the balance of power between the judiciary and formally independent regulatory bodies. The findings indicate the value of closer dialogue between regulators and courts in a context where regulatory agencies are increasingly called upon to make important technical and social choices on highly sensitive public issues.
À titre de régulateur économique, la Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec (RMAAQ) tranche les litiges contractuels entre organisations de producteurs et acheteurs qui découlent du cadre réglementaire et conventionnel applicable. Depuis quelques années, plusieurs indices portent à croire qu’un phénomène de judiciarisation de la résolution des conflits s’est développé, se répercutant notamment sur l'efficacité du processus de la RMAAQ et la performance globale du système. Qu’en est-il ? Quels facteurs contribuent à alimenter ce phénomène s’il existe réellement ? Dans une logique exploratoire, nous répondons à ces questions en documentant les composantes du processus et leur évolution depuis une quinzaine d’années, au travers l’analyse de 17 entretiens conduits auprès des offices, des acheteurs accrédités et d’avocats actifs dans ce domaine réglementé. Ce que nous retenons est que la judiciarisation des litiges n’est pas tant quantitative, mais plutôt qualitative. Les résultats montrent une judiciarisation accrue des litiges due à la complexité des enjeux économiques, à la dynamique et les rapports entre les intermédiaires devant la RMAAQ et à la faiblesse des modes alternatifs. De plus, un cycle de contrôle judiciaire des décisions de la RMAAQ, dans la décennie 2000-2010, semble avoir été déterminant. Depuis, une culture juridique s’est réellement institutionnalisée dans le processus résolution des conflits et la RMAAQ tente de la prendre en charge. L’article contribue à décrire un phénomène aux conséquences potentiellement nuisibles aux coûts de fonctionnement de la mise en marché collective et à explorer une importante institution du secteur agroalimentaire québécois encore peu analysée.
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