2010
DOI: 10.1177/1096348009350647
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Factors Affecting Franchise Decisions in the Restaurant Industry

Abstract: Franchising captures a sizeable portion of the restaurant industry and plays an important role in its growth. However, despite the importance of franchising to the restaurant industry, little has been done to investigate the characteristics of restaurant firms that engage in franchising. This study intends to explain what characteristics of restaurant firms relate to franchising. Accordingly, a logistic regression model was developed to identify variables that best differentiate restaurant franchisor firms fro… Show more

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Cited by 30 publications
(48 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
(78 reference statements)
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“…The so called adverse selection and moral hazard problems in agency theory highlight the difficulty of assessing the abilities and monitoring the performance of increasingly distant outlet managers (Contractor and Kundu 1998). However, although this argument may explain the adoption of a franchise system or not when making choices about how to grow and develop a company's distribution network (Hsu et al 2010;Hoover et al 2003), it is equally useful to explain the percentage of franchised outlets versus company-owned ones, once the company has already adopted a franchising system. According to Maruyama and Yamashita (2010), in the principal-agent model, franchising provides higher performance incentives than company-owned outlets, so that franchises would overshadow company-owned outlets.…”
Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 96%
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“…The so called adverse selection and moral hazard problems in agency theory highlight the difficulty of assessing the abilities and monitoring the performance of increasingly distant outlet managers (Contractor and Kundu 1998). However, although this argument may explain the adoption of a franchise system or not when making choices about how to grow and develop a company's distribution network (Hsu et al 2010;Hoover et al 2003), it is equally useful to explain the percentage of franchised outlets versus company-owned ones, once the company has already adopted a franchising system. According to Maruyama and Yamashita (2010), in the principal-agent model, franchising provides higher performance incentives than company-owned outlets, so that franchises would overshadow company-owned outlets.…”
Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…According to this perspective, firms engage in franchising systems to obtain the required capital and managerial experience needed to grow (Combs and Ketchen 1999b;Maruyama and Yamashita 2010). Thus, smaller less-established firms frequently use franchising to obtain the economies of scale required to compete, because they often encounter difficulties in raising capital and developing the managerial talent to grow (Castrogiovanni et al 2006;Hsu et al 2010). However, once a company achieves a certain scale, it can shift more attention to profitability, which means more firm ownership according to the resource-scarcity theory (Caves and Murphy 1976).…”
Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 98%
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