Factoring RSA Keys from Certified Smart Cards: Coppersmith in the Wild

Bernstein, Daniel J.; Chang, Yun An; Chen, Cheng; Chou, Lin‐Na; Heninger, Nadia; Lange, Tanja; Someren, Nicko van

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-42045-0_18

Cited by 75 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 12 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…Amar Pandey says about correlation attack through his research article named as "Correlation Attacks on Stream Cipher" [11]. To success the correlation attack, the hackers need to known about the structure of key stream generator.…”

Section: ×8mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

An Overview of Cryptanalysis of RSA Public key System

Berlin¹,

S.S²

2017

IJET

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Abstract-The RSA Cryptosystem was released in 1977. It used two distinct mathematically designed keys for both encryption and decryption process. RSA was one of the first practical public key cryptosystem among the various kinds of public key system. It secured sensitive data while the transmission of secrets through the improper channel like internet. It key sizes 1024 to 4096, 768 bit key had been broken. However 3328 bit typical keys are unbreakable. So it has been used for extensive research among the public key area researchers. The main principle of RSA is providing tough security from the difficulty of factoring large integers. The contribution of this paper is producing an overview of cryptanalysis on the RSA public key cryptosystem. From this research among the various attacks, timing attack has been interrupt against security in RSA algorithm. Hence the paper has proposed RSA cryptosystem is still a good security to transmit sensitive data.

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Section: ×8mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If the entire structure of the generator is known and the secret key is only the initial states of LFSRs, then for a key stream generator consisting of n LFSRs. In Brute force attack, the total number of keys to be tried for the break is П(2 L i -1) where L i is the length of the i th LFSR( Linear Feedback Shift Registers) [11].…”

Section: ×8mentioning

confidence: 99%

An Overview of Cryptanalysis of RSA Public key System

Berlin¹,

S.S²

2017

IJET

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“…The NAXOS protocol after application of the Cremers-Feltz compiler [11]. 3 Our construction instantiated with a secure NIKE scheme in the random-oracle model. 4 Our construction instantiated with a standard-model NIKE scheme.…”

Section: Efficiency Comparison With Other Orke Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However in practice, there are many famous examples where a flawed (i.e., low-entropy) generation of random numbers has led to serious security flaws. These include, for instance, the Debian OpenSSL bug, 1 the results of Lenstra et al [28] and Heninger et al [17] on the distribution of public keys on the Internet, or the case of certified smart cards considered by Bernstein et al [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

One-Round Key Exchange with Strong Security: An Efficient and Generic Construction in the Standard Model

Bergsma

Jager

Schwenk

2015

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. One-round authenticated key exchange (ORKE) is an established research area, with many prominent protocol constructions like HMQV (Krawczyk, CRYPTO 2005) and Naxos (La Macchia et al., ProvSec 2007), and many slightly different, strong security models. Most constructions combine ephemeral and static Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE), in a manner often closely tied to the underlying security model. We give a generic construction of ORKE protocols from general assumptions, with security in the standard model, and in a strong security model where the attacker is even allowed to learn the randomness or the longterm secret of either party in the target session. The only restriction is that the attacker must not learn both the randomness and the long-term secret of one party of the target session, since this would allow him to recompute all internal states of this party, including the session key. This is the first such construction that does not rely on random oracles. The construction is intuitive, relatively simple, and efficient. It uses only standard primitives, namely non-interactive key exchange, a digital signature scheme, and a pseudorandom function, with standard security properties, as building blocks.

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“…This is due to issues including poor algorithmic design, software bugs, insufficient or poor estimation of system entropy, and the handling of randomness across virtual machine resets [29]. The results of randomness failures can be catastrophic and newsworthy in practice -DSA, ECDSA and Schnorr private signing keys can be exposed [9,29]; plaintext recovery for low entropy plaintext becomes possible in the the public key encryption setting; key generation processes can be severely weakened [13,25,23,10]; ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys can become predictable leading to compromise of session keys [19]; and electronic wallet security can be compromised [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Related Randomness Attacks for Public Key Encryption

Paterson

Schuldt

Sibborn

2014

Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2014

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Abstract. Several recent and high-profile incidents give cause to believe that randomness failures of various kinds are endemic in deployed cryptographic systems. In the face of this, it behoves cryptographic researchers to develop methods to immunise -to the extent that it is possible -cryptographic schemes against such failures. This paper considers the practically-motivated situation where an adversary is able to force a public key encryption scheme to reuse random values, and functions of those values, in encryption computations involving adversarially chosen public keys and messages. It presents a security model appropriate to this situation, along with variants of this model. It also provides necessary conditions on the set of functions used in order to attain this security notation, and demonstrates that these conditions are also sufficient in the Random Oracle Model. Further standard model constructions achieving weaker security notions are also given, with these constructions having interesting connections to other primitives including: pseudo-random functions that are secure in the related key attack setting; Correlated Input Secure hash functions; and public key encryption schemes that are secure in the auxiliary input setting (this being a special type of leakage resilience).

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Factoring RSA Keys from Certified Smart Cards: Coppersmith in the Wild

Cited by 75 publications

References 12 publications

An Overview of Cryptanalysis of RSA Public key System

An Overview of Cryptanalysis of RSA Public key System

One-Round Key Exchange with Strong Security: An Efficient and Generic Construction in the Standard Model

Related Randomness Attacks for Public Key Encryption

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