Fact Finding in Public Employment Disputes: Promise of Illusion?

McKelvey, Jean T.

doi:10.2307/2521714

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Karper (1994) notes that public sector factfmding includes examples in which the fact-fmder is influential and non-influential. McKelvey (1969) notes that fact fmding may be used to economize on legislators ' time (i.e., influential fact finding) . However, McKelvey also predicts that legislative bodies in New York would largely ignore recommendations as they grew in sophistication, and Karper (1994) finds evidence that this did occur in at least some government sectors (e.g., non-influential fact We find that, contrary to the uncertainty hypothesis of Farber and Katz (1979), factfinding reduces the likelihood of dispute.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Fact-Finding Promote Settlement? Theory and a Test

Dickinson

Hunnicutt

2005

Economic Inquiry

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Some labor negotiations include a break in which a non-binding recommendation is made by a fact-finder as an intermediate dispute resolution procedure. There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether this fact-finding increases or reduces the likelihood of settlement.Inasmuch as fact-finding reduces uncertainty about the outcome, it may "chill" bargaining and increase the need for additional dispute resolution procedures. On the other hand, the fact-finder's recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which they are able to craft an agreement, thus reducing the incidence of disputes. Which of these effects dominates is a question that we consider using both a theoretical model and data from a controlled experimental bargaining environment.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Fact-Finding Promote Settlement? Theory and a Test

Dickinson

Hunnicutt

2005

Economic Inquiry

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“…As negotiators become more sophisticated in collective bargaining and the public becomes indifferent or immune to pressure from fact-finder reports, the effectiveness of fact-finding will diminish (McKelvey 1969;Kochan 1979). …”

Section: Hypotheses and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Fact‐Finding Effectiveness: Evidence from New York State Fact‐Finding Effectiveness

Hebdon

2001

Industrial Relations

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In a collective‐bargaining environment characterized by increasing fiscal and taxpayer pressures, this article examines the continued viability of fact‐finding as a dispute‐resolution mechanism in New York State's public sector. This is an important question because fact‐finding is the final dispute‐resolution procedure for most unionized employees in New York and many other states. Whether fact‐finding effectiveness was measured by the proximity of fact‐finder recommendations to the final settlement or by outright acceptance of the fact‐finder report, regression results show that New York fact‐finding has successfully met the challenges of the intensified environmental pressures in the 1990s. No significant decline was found in its ability to move parties toward the compromise outcome. Part of the fact‐finding's continued success can be attributed to the policy shift by New York's Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) in 1991 in the role of the fact‐finder from an accommodative to a more adjudicative function. The well‐reasoned adjudicative fact‐finding report has more potential to bring public pressure to bear on the extreme positions of the parties. Mediation was better left to the professional PERB mediators. Finally, it also was found that fact‐finders who were full‐time neutrals were more effective under this more adjudicative style.

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