Eyewitness testimony research: Current knowledge and emergent controversies.

Abstract

Psychological research on eyewitness testimony has flourished over the last decade and there are now a number of findings that appear relevant to police and courts. We review some of the major eyewitness research findings regarding such things as the relationship between accuracy and confidence, the identification of perpetrators from lineups, and the influence of misleading information on eyewitness memory and reports. Next, we discuss a controversy over the application of eyewitness research in the courtroom, namely expert testimony. The debate regarding expert testimony has sharpened researchers' conceptions of generalization problems and the quality of jurors' knowledge about eyewitness accuracy, as well as raising concerns about the proper role of experimental psychologists in the legal system. We propose that the confusion and controversy over expert testimony stems largely from the fact that expert testimony represents an attempt to provide services to the judicial phase, rather than the evidence-production phase, of the fact-finding process. EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY RESEARCH: CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND EMERGENT CONTROVERSIES Courtroom testimony by an eyewitness is preceded by a varied and dynamic set of psychological processes. Given the complex interaction of perception, memory, judgement, social influence, and communication processes that lead up to an eyewitness's story of what happened, it should hardly be surprising that such testimony often is a faulty version of the original event. Nevertheless, courts of law have relied heavily on eyewitness testimony and they will continue to do so. What do psychologists know about eyewitness testimony that could aid its understanding, prediction, and control? In this article we discuss several of the major findings in eyewitness-testimony research in recent years. 1 Included is a Requests for reprints should be addressed to

A theoretical review of the misinformation effect: Predictions from an activation-based memory model

“…If, under some circumstances, witnesses' memories may differ from the actual events,jurors should be made aware ofthis. Several good discussions on this subject and other related social issues already exist (see, e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1993;Lindsay & Read, 1994;Loftus, 1991;Wells & Turtle, 1987). Preparation of this manuscript was supported by Grant NOOOI4-95-1-0223 from the Office ofNaval Research, Grant IROI MH52808-01 from the National Institutes of Mental Health, and AFOSR Grant F49620-97-1-0054.…”

The accuracy-confidence relationship in an eyewitness task: anxiety as a modifier

“…It would seem that the acceptance by jurors that there is a strong positive relationship between eyewitness accuracy and confidence is unjustified (e.g., Weingardt, Leonesio and Loftus, 1994), with some researchers suggesting that there is almost no relationship (e.g., Clifford and Hollin, 1981;Clifford and Scott, 1978;Deffenbacher, Brown and Sturgill, 1978;Leippe, Wells and Ostrom, 1978;Smith, Kassin and Ellsworth, 1989;Wells et al, 1981). Numerous studies, however, have found reliable positive correlations between accuracy and confidence (e.g., Murray and Wells, 1982;Sporer, 1992;Yarmey, 1993), and Wells and Turtle (1987) pointed out that even non-significant correlations are almost always positive. The most appropriate conclusion from a meta-analysis across 35 studies would seem to be that confidence and accuracy are modestly related, at least for identification (Bothwell, Deffenbacher and Brigham, 1987), a conclusion supported by the metaanalysis reported by Sporer, Penrod, Read and Cutler (1995).…”

Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held

“…Finally, it is possible that, for some subjects, the "screwdriver" information could have changed the earlier memory of hammer. In a review of these reasons, Wells and Turtle (1987) state that it "remains unclear whether subjects' memories are actually altered by misleading [information] or whether their reports are altered while their memories remain intact and unaltered" (p. 373). Later, they argue that "although there seems little doubt that misleading postevent information distorts the testimony of many respondents, it is not clear if it actually alters the respondents' original memories" (p. 374).…”