2020
DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12629
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Eyes on the prize: CEO and director retirement preferences and acquisitions

Abstract: We examine whether the age of CEOs and independent directors impacts the likelihood of receiving a successful takeover offer. First, we replicate and confirm the results of Jenter and Lewellen and find that retirement age CEOs (age 64-66) are more likely to receive successful takeover offers. Second, we extend their study by investigating the retirement preferences of independent directors. We find that the likelihood of receiving a successful takeover offer increases when a higher proportion of independent di… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 39 publications
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“…Following CEO performance-induced removal, CEOs of competitor firms will reinforce the motivation to convey positive short-run outcomes proxied by ROA in the immediate aftermath. Thus, the logic of the disciplinary effect of CEO performance-induced removal on other firms in the same industry in S&P-1500 listed firms is strongly supported in line with earlier studies (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011; Clout et al ., 2021). Removing a poorly performing CEO is a critical decision that triggers CEOs operating with the same peers to respond positively in the U.S. market to evade any potential threat of removal from office.…”
Section: Empirical Findingssupporting
confidence: 84%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Following CEO performance-induced removal, CEOs of competitor firms will reinforce the motivation to convey positive short-run outcomes proxied by ROA in the immediate aftermath. Thus, the logic of the disciplinary effect of CEO performance-induced removal on other firms in the same industry in S&P-1500 listed firms is strongly supported in line with earlier studies (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011; Clout et al ., 2021). Removing a poorly performing CEO is a critical decision that triggers CEOs operating with the same peers to respond positively in the U.S. market to evade any potential threat of removal from office.…”
Section: Empirical Findingssupporting
confidence: 84%
“…A better response can demonstrate their ability and defend their position, making it more likely. Therefore, such an event is expected to divert CEOs' policies to short-term performance, possibly reducing investments in long-term projects that could generate shareholder rental (Clout et al ., 2021). Our R&D spending findings require careful explanation.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several studies examined the role of different types of board demography in different external change types (Bachmann & Spiropoulos, 2021; Clout et al., 2021). Furthermore, a large body of research examined the role of different board human and social capital in acquisitions (e.g., Greve & Zhang, 2017; Güner et al., 2008; Hilscher & Şişli‐Ciamarra, 2013; Masulis & Mobbs, 2011; McDonald et al., 2008).…”
Section: Board Governance Of Different Strategic Change Typesmentioning
confidence: 99%