Extrinsic Democratic Proceduralism: A Modest Defence

Destri, Chiara

doi:10.1007/s11158-020-09456-2

Cited by 20 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(28 reference statements)

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“…SENI can be interpreted as offering an extrinsic but non-instrumental valuation of democracy (cf. Destri, 2021;Viehoff, 2017;Ziliotti, 2020). 3.…”

Section: Declaration Of Conflicting Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social equality and the conditional justifiability of political inequality

Kobayashi

2023

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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Social or relational egalitarians try to defend democracy non-instrumentally as a constitutive element of a society where no one stands as inferior or superior to anyone else. However, they face an instrumentalist challenge from within: Why not uphold a non-democratic regime if it outperforms democracy in protecting or promoting egalitarian social relations, for example, by stably producing substantive political decisions that guard against social hierarchies? This article explores the best response to this challenge from the social egalitarian non-instrumentalist standpoint. It argues that the instrumentalist challenge can be accommodated without abandoning the essential non-instrumentalist commitment to democracy; while a nondemocratic regime may be justified under less-than-ideal circumstances as a contingently effective means to realize more social equality, democracy can nevertheless be viewed as a necessary condition for the realization of full social equality.

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“…SENI can be interpreted as offering an extrinsic but non-instrumental valuation of democracy (cf. Destri, 2021;Viehoff, 2017;Ziliotti, 2020). 3.…”

Section: Declaration Of Conflicting Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social equality and the conditional justifiability of political inequality

Kobayashi

2023

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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“…Democracy has non-instrumental value if there is reason to value democracy for what it is and if these are reasons that do not depend on how democracy performs. Democracy's non-instrumental value is explained either by it being a part of something else that is morally important or by its symbolic value (Destri, 2021;Zilotti, 2020). Not all reasons for valuing democracy fit neatly with the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental value.…”

Section: Democracy's Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy

Beckman¹

2021

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics

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Democracy is a term that is used to denote a variety of distinct objects and ideas. Democracy describes either a set of political institutions or an ideal of collective self-rule. Democracy can also be short for a normative principle of either legitimacy or justice. Finally, democracy might be used to denote an egalitarian attitude. These four uses of the term should be kept distinct and raises separate conceptual and normative issues. The value of democracy, whether democratic political institutions or democratic self-rule, is either instrumental, non-instrumental, or both. The non-instrumental value of democracy derives either from the alleged fairness of majority rule or from the value of the social relationships enabled by participation in democratic procedures. The instrumental value of democracy lends support from a growing body of empirical research. Yet, the claim that democracy has a positive causal effect on public goods is inconclusive with respect to the moral justification of democratic institutions. Normative reasons for democracy’s instrumental value must instead appeal to the fact that it contributes to equality, liberty, truth, or the realization of popular will. Democracy as a principle of either political legitimacy or justice is a normative view that evades concerns with the definition and value of democracy. Normative democracy is a claim about the conditions either for legitimacy or justice of either public authority or coercion. Debates in normative democracy are largely divorced from the conceptual and empirical concerns that inform studies of democracy elsewhere. The boundaries of the people entitled to participate in collective decisions is a question that applies to all four uses of democracy. The boundary question raises three distinct issues. The first is the extent of inclusion required among the members of the unit. The second is if membership in the unit is necessary for inclusion or if people that are not recognized as members are on certain conditions also entitled to participate. The third and final issue concerns the boundaries of the unit itself.

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An Instrumentalist Theory of Political Legitimacy

Brinkmann

2024

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This book defends instrumentalism, the claim that political legitimacy rests on promoting justice. This entails that power can be permissibly exercised without consent, democracy, or public justification. In the book’s first part, a revisionary understanding of the problem of legitimacy is defended. Legitimacy is defined as the permissibility of exercising power. This entails that the problem of legitimacy is separate from the problem of justifying political obligations. Furthermore, legitimacy can exist without political authority. Instrumentalism is described and defended in the book’s second part. The view is based on a hybrid theory of justice that recognizes both aims and constraints. The importance of justice is defended against competitor views which prioritize stability or perfection. A series of suggestions is made how instrumentalism should be formulated, in particular, that it should take a sophisticated two-level structure. The third part of the book argues against three competing theories. It is argued that consent is not necessary for legitimacy, and that strong, moral rights can be made compatible with the instrumentalist view. Proceduralist views which ground legitimacy on democracy are also rejected, but the possibility that democracy is a ‘secondary value’ within instrumentalism is explored. Lastly, it is shown that legitimacy does not rely on justifiability to reasonable people, but that legitimate governments can nonetheless accommodate disagreement in natural ways.

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Extrinsic Democratic Proceduralism: A Modest Defence

Cited by 20 publications

References 41 publications

Social equality and the conditional justifiability of political inequality

Social equality and the conditional justifiability of political inequality

Democracy

An Instrumentalist Theory of Political Legitimacy

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