Extracting information masked by chaos and contaminated with noise: Some considerations on the security of communication approaches using chaos

Zhou, Changsong; Tian-Lun, Chen

doi:10.1016/s0375-9601(97)00551-3

Cited by 57 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…As discussed above, the decryption error is not sensitive to the mismatch of {a µ , b µ , A µ , B µ }, so the searching complexity will be small practically. Assuming that the range of the four secret parameters are a µ ∈ [12,50], b µ ∈ [2.5, 9.5], A µ ∈ [0.02, 0.1], B µ ∈ [0.5, 2], respectively, the searching steps are chosen as δ aµ = δ bµ = 1, δ Aµ = 0.01, δ Bµ = 0.1, respectively 5 . Note that the range and the searching step of b µ are intentionally chosen to make sure that the real value b µ = 5 cannot be visited in the current searching precision, which is common in real attacks since the real values of the secret parameters are all unknown.…”

Section: A Reduction Of the Key Spacementioning

confidence: 99%

Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme

Álvarez

Chen

et al. 2005

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science

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This paper studies the security of a secure communication scheme based on two discrete-time intermittently-chaotic systems synchronized via a common random driving signal. Some security defects of the scheme are revealed: 1) the key space can be remarkably reduced; 2) the decryption is insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key; 3) the key-generation process is insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The first two defects mean that the scheme is not secure enough against brute-force attacks, and the third one means that an attacker can easily break the cryptosystem by approximately estimating the secret key once he has a chance to access a fragment of the generated keystream. Yet it remains to be clarified if intermittent chaos could be used for designing secure chaotic cryptosystems.Keywords: secure communication, encryption, cryptanalysis, intermittent chaos, noise, synchronizationIn [1], a new method of generating pseudorandom keys from discrete-time chaotic systems using a noise signal was proposed for designing secure communication schemes. In this method, the noise signal serves as a common driving signal to synchronize two dynamical systems and forces them to be intermittently chaotic, ensuring that they generate the same pseudo-random keys for both encryption and decryption. This paper studies the security of the above-referred secure communication scheme and points out its severe security defects, showing that the scheme is insecure against both inexpensive brute-force attacks and known/chosen-plaintext attacks. At present, it is not yet clear whether or not the existence of intermittent periodicity is always an essential defect of this kind of secure chaotic cryptosystems.

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Section: A Reduction Of the Key Spacementioning

confidence: 99%

Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme

Álvarez

Chen

et al. 2005

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science

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confidence: 79%

A digital secure image communication scheme based on the chaotic chebyshev map by Xiaofeng Liao, Xueming Li, Jun Pen, Guanrong ChenInternational Journal of Communication Systems 2004;17(5):437-445.

2005

Int. J. Commun. Syst.

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The authors would like to thank Dr Shujun Li for pointing out to them References [1,2]. These show that the encryption scheme proposed in their above paper is insecure against some attacks, as discussed in References [1,2]. 188:146-150. 2. Zhou C-S, Chen T-L. Extracting information masked by chaos and contaminated with noise: some considerations on the security of communication approaches using chaos.

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“…In [Zhou & Chen, 1997], the return map attack was also used to break a differential CSK scheme based on a discrete-time chaotic map [Parlitz & Ergezinger, 1994]. To facilitate the following discussion, without loss of generality, this paper will focus on the attack scheme of Pérez & Cerdeira on the Lorenz system thereby demonstrating how the return map is constructed and how the attack works to break a typical chaotic switching scheme proposed in [Cuomo & Openheim, 1993].…”

Section: Return-map Attacks and Related Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Return-Map Cryptanalysis Revisited

Chen

Álvarez

2006

Int. J. Bifurcation Chaos

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As a powerful cryptanalysis tool, the scheme of return-map attack can be used to extract secret messages masked by chaos in secure communication schemes. Recently, a simple defensive mechanism was presented to enhance the security of chaotic parameter modulation schemes against return-map attacks. Two techniques are combined in the proposed defensive mechanism: multistep parameter modulation and alternative driving of two different transmitter variables. This paper re-studies the security of this proposed defensive mechanism against return-map attacks, and points out that the security was much over-estimated by the authors for both ciphertext-only attack and known/chosen-plaintext attacks. It is found that a deterministic relationship exists between the shape of the return map and the modulated parameter, and that such a relationship can be used to dramatically enhance the return-map attack thereby making it easy to break the proposed mechanism.

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Extracting information masked by chaos and contaminated with noise: Some considerations on the security of communication approaches using chaos

Cited by 57 publications

References 11 publications

Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme

Breaking a chaos-noise-based secure communication scheme

A digital secure image communication scheme based on the chaotic chebyshev map by Xiaofeng Liao, Xueming Li, Jun Pen, Guanrong ChenInternational Journal of Communication Systems 2004;17(5):437-445.

Return-Map Cryptanalysis Revisited

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