External-Internal Standards in Corporate Governance in Nigeria

Nmehielle, Vincent O.; Nwauche, Enyinna S.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.627664

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Focusing on the emerging market of Nigeria, findings of some studies revealed that the weak investor protection mechanism and inadequate legal settings led to shareholders of Nigerian banks experiencing the high level of expropriation by bank managers (Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001; Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003; Nmehielle & Nwauche, 2004; Amaeshi, Adi, Ogechie, & Amao, 2006, Wilson, 2006; Okike, 2007; Inyang, 2009; Abdulmalik & Ahmad, 2016). Notably, findings of studies (Abor & Fiador, 2013; Adegbite, 2015; Ahunwan, 2002; Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009) showed that shareholders, especially minority shareholders, are exposed to the higher expropriation risk in Nigeria since the judicial system is not effective and the level of disclosure is high due to weak executive monitoring.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of institutional settings and risks on bank dividend policy in an emerging market: Evidence from Tobit model

Athari¹

2020

Int. J Fin Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study investigates specifically the effects of institutional settings and risks on dividend payout policy for banks operate in an emerging market of Nigeria. The present study measures the risk by using financial, business, credit, and default risk at the bank‐level and financial, economic, and political risk at the country level. To achieve the objective of this study, panel data random‐effects Tobit estimation methodology is employed from the period 2007–2016. Findings reveal that the weak institutional settings lead Nigerian banks to pay out fewer dividends and set their payouts corresponding to the substitution agency model of dividends. Also, results show that Nigerian banks typically pay out more dividends in cases of growth opportunity as a substitute mechanism for mitigating agency problems and for establishing a good reputation. However, by strengthening the levels of investor protection, Nigerian bank managers prefer a low payout policy and are less probable to use dividend policies as a substitute mechanism. Moreover, except for the positive effect of default risk, findings show that the risks at the bank‐level, in particular, business risk, and at the country level, particularly financial and economic risks, have a significant negative effect on dividend payouts. Results are robust to alternative estimation procedures and also document that global risk has a statistically significant negative impact on Nigerian banks' dividend payouts policy.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of institutional settings and risks on bank dividend policy in an emerging market: Evidence from Tobit model

Athari¹

2020

Int. J Fin Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Legislation to financial assets including exchange listing are covered under the Investment and Securities Act (ISA), the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA), the Insurance Act (IA) and the National Insurance Commission Act which governs the Nigerian financial system made up of bank and non-bank financial institutions. Apart from the government-mandated legislation, voluntary initiatives on corporate governance in Nigeria are enshrined in Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance (Nmehielle and Nwauche, 2004). The Central Bank of Nigeria Act (CBN Act) prescribes standards to guide the conduct of business regarding persons who are appointed chairmen, members of the board of directors and top management of banks.…”

Section: Nigeriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate disclosure and foreign share ownership: empirical evidence from African countries

Bokpin

Isshaq

Nyarko

2015

International Journal of Law and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Purpose – The study aims to seeks to ascertain the impact of corporate disclosure on foreign equity ownership. Corporate disclosures are important to for stock markets because it is an activity that mitigates information differences between company insiders and outsiders. Design/methodology/approach – Corporate disclosures assume an even greater important when company outsiders are not domiciled in the same country as the company and the company insiders. In this study, the relation between foreign share ownership and corporate disclosures using data on Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria is examined. Findings – The consistent results in this study are that foreign share ownership is positively related to firm size. A negative relation, however, between foreign share ownership and corporate disclosure is found, but this turns out to be related to disclosures about ownership, while disclosures on financial reporting and board management have a positive and insignificant statistical relation taking into account unobserved country, time and firm effects. Further analysis shows that corporate disclosures are very persistent and negatively related to lag foreign share ownership. No consistent statistical relation is found between disclosure and market-to-book values as a proxy for investment opportunities. It is recommended to African-listed firms to pursue adoption of high-quality financial reporting standards and to increase their reporting on board management. The study also recommends that the African Government weighs the benefits of detailed ownership disclosures. Originality/value – The study utilises frontier market data to complement existing literature on how corporate disclosure and transparency influences foreign investors decision to invest in Africa.

show abstract

“…Th e alternative would be to seek increased stakeholder activism as a control measure: shareholders associations, consumer protection groups, labour unions and the media being some of the more obvious groups. Researchers who have written about rent-seeking/captured relationships in corporate governance in Nigeria lament the extent of the problem between some of these groups and business (Apampa, 2008;Okike, 2007;Nmehielle & Nwauche, 2004;Yakasai, 2001). Business for its part would like to be left alone to self-regulate.…”

Section: S Letza Corporate Governance and The African Business Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In (Apampa, 2008), we learn that (Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001;Yakasai, 2001;Nmehielle & Nwauche, 2004;Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2005;Central Bank of Nigeria, 2006;Amao & Amaeshi, 2007) believe weak voice, power and participation to be responsible for weak control of companies by shareholders' associations in Nigeria. According to the philosopher Mill it is a personal injustice to withhold from anyone, unless for the prevention of greater evils, the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned with in the disposal of aff airs in which he has the same interests as other people and so the scheme must incorporate a robust public feedback and complaints handling system to ensure the principle of Voice (O'Toole, 1993).…”

Section: A Possible Response To Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and the African Business Context: the Case of Nigeria

Letza¹

2017

EBR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

ARTICLES Agency costs of overvalued equity and earnings management in companies listed on WSE (Michał Kałdoński, Tomasz Jewartowski) Friends or foes? Activist hedge funds and other institutional investors (Andrew Carrothers) Board ethos and institutional work: developing a corporate governance identity through developing the uk code (Donald Nordberg)Governance and fi nancing of innovative very small business (VSB): evidence from a Canadian biotechnological fi rm (Alidou Ouedraogo) Corporate governance, risk and crises in small companies: shedding light from inside the boardroom black box (Leslie Spiers) Gender diversity impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and Greenhouse Gas emissions in the UK (Renata Konadu)Lessons university-based business schools should learn vicariously-rather than through experience-from university athletics (Edward W. Miles) Commercialization of the education of economists versus integrity of the university (Jan Szambelańczyk) Abstract: A robust institutional framework is essential to enable fi rms to function effi ciently. Th e aspect of corporate governance investigated in this paper is the legal and societal principles and process which form the business context within which fi rms operate. Th e paper explores the challenges to fi rms trading in Africa arising from cultural dynamics peculiar to the continent and further explores the historical reasons for the present cultural context to business in Africa. Nigeria is presented as a special case, perhaps even an extreme case, of the challenges to corporate governance in Africa since it is perceived by many to be one of the weaker environments given its perceived levels of corruption. Th e paper concludes with an assessment of the likelihood of African states successfully tackling corruption in the future as the current approaches unfold over the coming years.

show abstract

External-Internal Standards in Corporate Governance in Nigeria

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

The effects of institutional settings and risks on bank dividend policy in an emerging market: Evidence from Tobit model

The effects of institutional settings and risks on bank dividend policy in an emerging market: Evidence from Tobit model

Corporate disclosure and foreign share ownership: empirical evidence from African countries

Corporate Governance and the African Business Context: the Case of Nigeria

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About