Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies

Simon, Leo K.; Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.

doi:10.2307/1913627

Cited by 201 publications

(136 citation statements)

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“…We also note that their proof method does not imply uniqueness, even under the setting in our paper. Papavassilopoulos and Cruz (1979) show that, in a certain class of deterministic models, an equilibrium is unique within the 2 We choose an imperfect monitoring set-up in order to avoid technical issues that can arise in formalizing perfect monitoring in continuous time (e.g., Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) and Bergin and MacLeod (1993)). In Supplementary Appendix C.2.1, we show a sense in which the monitoring imperfectness itself is not important for our uniqueness result, by using a discrete-time model with noisy state evolution.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness Under Noisy Monitoring

Iijima

Kasahara

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study the implications of flexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of finite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to affect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise.The values of these state variables influence players' terminal payoffs at the deadline, as well as their flow payoffs. In contrast to the static case, the equilibrium is unique under a general class of terminal payoff functions. Our characterization of the equilibrium builds on recent developments in the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). We use this tool to analyze applications, including team production, hold-up problems, and dynamic contests. In a team production model, the unique equilibrium selects an efficient outcome when frictions vanish.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also note that there is a technical issue in formulating non-Markovian strategies without noise in continuous time (e.g., Simon and Stinchcombe (1989)). …”

Section: Key Assumptions Underlying the Uniquenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness Under Noisy Monitoring

Iijima

Kasahara

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…2 ) by admissibility, it follows that the functions with the integrals in (20) are continuous over [0, T * 2 ). This implies that these integrals are themselves differentiable functions of t < T * 2 .…”

Section: Lemma 8 Any Admissible Solution G(· ; 0) To (15) Is Continuomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One first has the following lemma. (20) for all t < T * 2 . For any such t, the functions within the integrals in (20) are integrable over [0, t].…”

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Potential competition in preemption games

Bobtcheff

Mariotti

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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We consider a preemption game with two potential competitors who come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to a player only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same distribution of players' moving times. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each player's behavior from any time on is independent of the date at which she came into play. We find that competitive pressure is nonmonotonic over time, and that private information tends to alleviate rent dissipation. Our results have a natural interpretation in terms of eroding reputations.

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