2004
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2004.05.002
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Extending the global workspace theory to emotion: Phenomenality without access

Abstract: Recent accounts on the global workspace theory suggest that consciousness involves transient formations of functional connections in thalamo-cortico-cortical networks. The level of connectivity in these networks is argued to determine the state of consciousness. Emotions are suggested to play a role in shaping consciousness, but their involvement in the global workspace theory remains elusive. In the present study, the role of emotion in the neural workspace theory of consciousness was scrutinized by investiga… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…The networks of leaders were more likely to contain modules comprised of electrodes from distant parts of the brain than the networks of followers, perhaps reflecting different cognitive states associated with different network structures (cf. Schutter and Van Honck, 2004). Dehaene et al (1998) has linked a network of distributed and interconnected neural ensembles with the notion of a “global workspace,” which is activated by effortful tasks.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The networks of leaders were more likely to contain modules comprised of electrodes from distant parts of the brain than the networks of followers, perhaps reflecting different cognitive states associated with different network structures (cf. Schutter and Van Honck, 2004). Dehaene et al (1998) has linked a network of distributed and interconnected neural ensembles with the notion of a “global workspace,” which is activated by effortful tasks.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, they argue that our "raw emotional experiences" are created subcortically and constitute the primordial neural ground upon which all forms of conscious processing are built. Emotions, therefore, do not merely provide for "global valence tagging" in the cognitive realm, but mediate the subject's strategic quest for adaptive homeostasis in both immediate (e.g., hunger, thirst, fear, anger) and more enduring timeframes (e.g., goal-directed behavior, dominance status, attachment/bonding) (Schutter & Van Honk 2004a;Van Honk & Schutter 2005). In the next subsection, a triple-layered model of "affective consciousness" adapted from Panksepp and Panksepp (2000) is outlined.…”
Section: Gualtiero Piccininimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But is the detection of these meaningless scenes not a misadaptation supervening on the incapability of the visual-attentional system to shut down when nothing of interest is happening? Consciousness cannot be equated with such epiphenomenal forms of detection, but probably defensibly evolved to provide for more flexibility in social-emotional contexts, which are packed with meaning and stuffed with raw feelings -that is, qualia and emotions (Buck 1999;Ressler 2004;Schutter & Van Honk 2004a). This is exactly why hallucinations in schizophrenia carry their typical affective tone, as described by B&Y.…”
Section: Deregulation Of the Balance Between Data And Conceptually Drmentioning
confidence: 99%