Extended Sex: An Account of Sex for a More Just Society

Ayala, Saray; Vasilyeva, Nadya

doi:10.1111/hypa.12180

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…This application of ExM to neurofeminism may be further supported by recent attempts to substantiate the idea of ‘extended sex’ (Merritt; Ayala and Vasilyeva). It may also pave the way towards addressing Schmitz and Höppner's concerns that neurofeminists must consider other models of the relationship between the brain and the environment/culture, since ‘… brain and culture [should be] understood as being indivisibly intertwined in an assemblage of reciprocal exchange, constituting and continuously re‐shaping each other’ (Schmitz and Höppner 5).…”

Section: Forms Of Neurosexismmentioning

confidence: 68%

“…Furthermore, such statements are fueled by the notions that those categories are clear, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive. But these notions, applied to the categories of ‘female’ and ‘male’ (or ‘women’ and ‘men’) have been vigorously challenged by neuro‐ and other feminists (Fausto‐Sterling, ‘The Five Sexes, Revisited’; Ayala and Vasilyeva 727–728; Butler). Fausto‐Sterling, for example, has argued that some of the most intuitive ways to bifurcate humans into two genders (for example: necessary conditions for being male include the presence of a Y chromosome, a penis, and testicles) are met with counter‐examples in nature (‘The Five Sexes, Revisited’).…”

Section: Forms Of Neurosexismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Neurosexism and Neurofeminism

Hoffman

Bluhm

2016

Philosophy Compass

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As neuroscience has gained an increased ability to enchant the general public, it has become more and more common to appeal to it as an authority on a wide variety of questions about how humans do and should act. This is especially apparent with the question of gender roles. The term ‘neurosexism’ has been coined to describe the phenomenon of using neuroscientific practices and results to promote sexist conclusions; its feminist response is called ‘neurofeminism’. Here, our aim is to survey the phenomena of neurosexism and neurofeminism using a largely philosophical approach, incorporating concepts from the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science, ethics, and feminist philosophy. First, we delineate how neuroscientific studies purporting to show sex brain differences may be prone to bias at a number of methodological levels – including the choice of categories to be studied, and the choice of tools for data gathering, analysis, and presentation. Then, we show how interpretations of such studies may wrongly assume the notion of ‘hard‐wiring’. Furthermore, lack of attention to distinctions within philosophy of mind may result in a mistaken supposition that brain differences lead to mental and/or psychological and/or behavioral ones. It is not difficult to see how these forms of neurosexism, leading to claims of ‘hard‐wired’ gender differences that map onto traditional and harmful gender stereotypes, raise ethical questions. We conclude by briefly considering one: are the harms caused by neurosexist studies and their interpretations outweighed by their potential benefits?

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Section: Forms Of Neurosexismmentioning

confidence: 68%

Section: Forms Of Neurosexismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neurosexism and Neurofeminism

Hoffman

Bluhm

2016

Philosophy Compass

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“…I presuppose her processual ontology where concepts are boundary-making material practices. The categories are spectra with ragged, overlapping, and fluid boundaries, “categorical divides over continuous variability” (Ayala and Vasilyeva 2015, 729).…”

Section: The Table Of Counterexamples As a Nonbinary Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Nonbinary Model of Gender/Sex Traits

Ziemińska

2022

Hypatia

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I argue against the exclusive female/male divide, referring to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice in the cases of people with nonbinary gender identities and people with intersex traits. Such people have traits that are counterexamples to the binary female/male model. I have separated female and male traits into nine basic layers, five of which belong to sex (chromosomes, gonads, internal sex organs, external genitals, and secondary sex characteristics) and four to gender (gender identity, legal gender, external gender presentation, and gender pronouns). In every layer, I have found traits that are neither female nor male, and the application of the model to individuals provides examples of clusters of traits for which one layer is male and another female. Such traits and clusters of traits create the category of the nonbinary. Table 1 provides a sketch of a nonbinary model. The nonbinary category takes its name from the existing category of nonbinary gender identity; however, in the current model, it is a third category of traits, not of people. Under the nonbinary model, the basic gender concepts do not disappear. S is a woman if S is a human being with enough female traits, and the trait of having self-determined female gender identity is sufficient but not necessary.

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“…Feminist work further examines the idea‐construction of sex concepts (cf. Ayala and Vasilyeva ; Butler , ; Stone : Chapter 1). The concept of sex is said to be socially produced in the sense that what counts as sex depends on what we take to be socially meaningful in particular contexts.…”

Section: Negotiating the Naturalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Feminist Metaphysics and Philosophical Methodology

Mikkola

2016

Philosophy Compass

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Over the past few decades, feminist philosophy has become recognised as a philosophical sub‐discipline in its own right. Among the ‘core’ areas of philosophy, metaphysics has nonetheless until relatively recently remained largely dismissive of it. Metaphysics typically investigates the basic structure of reality and its nature. It examines reality's putative building blocks and inherent structure supposedly ‘out there’ with the view to uncovering and elucidating that structure. For this task, feminist insights appear simply irrelevant. Moreover, the value‐neutrality of metaphysics seems prima facie incompatible with feminism's explicitly normative stance in that feminist philosophy involves advocacy: speaking on behalf of some group on political grounds. The prospects of feminist metaphysics thus look grim. Nonetheless, feminist philosophers have in recent years increasingly taken up explicitly metaphysical investigations. The basic ideas behind such investigations can be summed up as follows: feminist metaphysics is about negotiating the natural and going beyond the fundamental. In so doing, feminist investigations have expanded the scope of metaphysics. Further, feminist philosophers typically bring new methodological insights to bear on traditional ways of doing philosophy. With this in mind, the article considers the following questions: when thinking about philosophical methodology, how does feminist metaphysics fare relative to ‘mainstream’ metaphysics? More specifically, is feminism's political advocacy inconsistent with apparent objectivity that some prominent contemporary versions of metaphysics are committed to?

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Extended Sex: An Account of Sex for a More Just Society

Cited by 11 publications

References 28 publications

Neurosexism and Neurofeminism

Neurosexism and Neurofeminism

Toward a Nonbinary Model of Gender/Sex Traits

Feminist Metaphysics and Philosophical Methodology

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