Extended Phenotype – But Not Too Extended. A Reply to Laland, Turner and Jablonka

Dawkins, Richard

doi:10.1023/b:biph.0000036180.14904.96

Cited by 197 publications

(174 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…It is a view that devalues so-called proximate causes, including developmental processes such as learning, and human cultural processes in evolutionary biology [13,14]. In SET, niche-construction effects caused by developmental or proximate processes can be regarded as the expression of phenotypic plasticity [15], or sometimes as extended phenotypes [16], but ultimately they still have to be explained by prior natural selection [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human niche construction in interdisciplinary focus

Kendal

Tehrani

Odling‐Smee

2011

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

289

156

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Niche construction is an endogenous causal process in evolution, reciprocal to the causal process of natural selection. It works by adding ecological inheritance, comprising the inheritance of natural selection pressures previously modified by niche construction, to genetic inheritance in evolution. Human niche construction modifies selection pressures in environments in ways that affect both human evolution, and the evolution of other species. Human ecological inheritance is exceptionally potent because it includes the social transmission and inheritance of cultural knowledge, and material culture. Human genetic inheritance in combination with human cultural inheritance thus provides a basis for gene -culture coevolution, and multivariate dynamics in cultural evolution. Niche construction theory potentially integrates the biological and social aspects of the human sciences. We elaborate on these processes, and provide brief introductions to each of the papers published in this theme issue.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human niche construction in interdisciplinary focus

Kendal

Tehrani

Odling‐Smee

2011

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

289

156

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“…For examples of phenotypes manifest in ecosystems or other larger wholes, see Whitham et al (2003). See also Dawkins (1982);Laland (2004);and Dawkins (2004) for a discussion of niche construction. Agar argues against what he considers a "too much extended phenotype" on pragmatic grounds: he claims that conventional biologists and researchers into genetic diseases typically are not interested in phenotypic effects quite so broad, and so we are justified in limiting our attribution of phenotypes to those that do not "go beyond the skin" of the organism possessing the genes that are causally responsible for them (Agar, 2001, pp.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individualist Biocentrism vs. Holism Revisited

McShane

2014

ateliers

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While holist views such as ecocentrism have considerable intuitive appeal, arguing for the moral considerability of ecological wholes such as ecosystems has turned out to be a very difficult task. In the environmental ethics literature, individualist biocentrists have persuasively argued that individual organisms—but not ecological wholes—are properly regarded as having a good of their own . In this paper, I revisit those arguments and contend that they are fatally flawed. The paper proceeds in five parts. First, I consider some problems brought about by climate change for environmental conservation strategies and argue that these problems give us good pragmatic reasons to want a better account of the welfare of ecological wholes. Second, I describe the theoretical assumptions from normative ethics that form the background of the arguments against holism. Third, I review the arguments given by individualist biocentrists in favour of individualism over holism. Fourth, I review recent work in the philosophy of biology on the units of selection problem, work in medicine on the human biome, and work in evolutionary biology on epigenetics and endogenous viral elements. I show how these developments undermine both the individualist arguments described above as well as the distinction between individuals and wholes as it has been understood by individualists. Finally, I consider five possible theoretical responses to these problems.Quoique les perspectives holistes telles que l’écocentrisme exercent un attrait intuitif considérable, affirmer la considérabilité morale des touts écologiques comme des écosystèmes s’est avéré une tâche très difficile. Dans la littérature en éthique de l’environnement, certains biocentristes individualistes ont argumenté de manière persuasive qu’un organisme individuel, mais pas un tout écologique, peut correctement être considéré comme possédant son propre bien. Dans le présent article, nous réexaminons ces arguments et soutenons qu’ils sont voués à l’échec. Ce travail est divisé en cinq parties. Premièrement, nous nous penchons sur certains des problèmes que pose le changement climatique pour les stratégies de conservation de l’environnement et affirmons que ces problèmes fournissent de bonnes raisons pragmatiques pour lesquelles chercher une meilleure compréhension du bien-être des touts écologiques. Deuxièmement, nous décrivons les a priori théoriques de l’éthique normative qui sous-tendent les arguments contre l’holisme. Troisièmement, nous réexaminons les arguments de biocentristes individualistes appuyant l’individualisme et rejetant l’holisme. Quatrièmement, nous explorons de récents travaux en philosophie de la biologie sur le problème de l’unité de sélection du biome humain en médecine et des éléments épigénétiques et viraux endogènes en biologie évolutionniste. Nous montrons en quoi ces conceptions minent à la fois les arguments individualistes susmentionnés et la distinction entre l’individu et le tout tel que compris par les individualistes. Finalement, nous considérons cinq rép...

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“…Understanding what happens in development seemed incredibly difficult and the prospects for coherent explanations of the type found in, say, evolutionary biology did not seem rosy. Dawkins (1982Dawkins ( , 2004 liked to contrast the clarity of thinking about the ''Immortal Replicator'' with the obscurantism associated with what he called the ''Great Nexus.'' However, the implied belief of the developmentalists that everything interacts with everything else was a caricature.…”

Section: Patrick Batesonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a framework for development: A discussion

Bateson

Hofer

Oppenheim

et al. 2006

Developmental Psychobiology

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A multitude of scientific disciplines study the development of behavior. Their use of different methodological and conceptual approaches makes integration of findings difficult. In a symposium at the 38th Annual Meeting of the International Society for Developmental Psychobiology in Washington DC, the question was discussed if a general theory of development could unify the field. The three participants explain their views and discuss the possibility of a theoretical framework for development. ß 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Dev Psychobiol 49: 77-86, 2007.

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Extended Phenotype – But Not Too Extended. A Reply to Laland, Turner and Jablonka

Cited by 197 publications

References 14 publications

Human niche construction in interdisciplinary focus

Human niche construction in interdisciplinary focus

Individualist Biocentrism vs. Holism Revisited

Developing a framework for development: A discussion

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