Exposition Effects on Decision Making: Choice and Confidence in Choice

Effects of attribute framing on cognitive processing and evaluation

“…By including a no-framing condition, we were able to examine the magnitude of framing effects and found that participants receiving positive framing were more affected by attribute framing than those receiving negative framing. Also this finding is consistent with asymmetrical information processing effects of negative versus positive framing and the position that more effortful and less heuristic processing may reduce susceptibility to cognitive biases (e.g., Sieck & Yates, 1997;Takemura, 1994;Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This is not to say, however, that effortful processing should always reduce framing effects.…”

“…Accordingly, if negative framing decision makers engage in more systematic and relatively less heuristic processing than positive framing decision makers, they should also deviate less from rational norms of decision making and be less susceptible to attribute framing effects. Indirect support for this prediction is provided by research evidence showing that induced elaborated thinking eliminates or reduces risky choice framing effects, such as when decision makers are asked to provide justification for their choice or spend more time on a decision making task (e.g., Sieck & Yates, 1997;Takemura, 1982Takemura, , 1994. Another piece of indirect evidence stems from studies revealing that subjects with higher need-for-cognition scores 1 are less susceptible to risky choice framing effects (Chatterjee et al, 2000;Smith & Levin, 1996).…”

The Impact of Mathematical Competences and Cognitive Effort on the Appearance of the Framing Effect

“…Takemura's study supported this method, however the results obtained by Sieck and Yates (1997) show that only getting the subjects to write the account removes the effect, which may mean that it is not only the motivation but also a 're-framing' of the scenario that reduces the effect. Contrary to those findings, in the study by Igou and Bless (2007), with the manipulation of the importance of the choice ('serious' vs. 'pilot' study tags) the effect disappeared in participants held accountable in a study tagged as a 'pilot' study, but was present in the one representing a 'serious' condition.…”

Justification effects on the judgment of analogy

“…A substantial number of studies support the claim that explanation of a possibility increases the confidence in or the likelihood of the truth of that possibility (Koehler, 1991;Koonce, 1992;Phillips, Koonce, & Hopkins, 1994;Sieck & Yates, 1997). In his review of earlier studies, Koehler suggests that confidence in a hypothesis is increased because people approach the task by assuming that the hypothesis is true and assessing how plausibly it accounts for the available evidence.…”

“…Studies of learning and instruction indicate that students learn more when explaining examples to themselves (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989;VanLehn & Jones, 1993), and justifying one's reasoning has been shown to facilitate problem-solving performance, at least under some conditions (Ahlum-Heath & Di Vesta, 1986;Gagne & Smith, 1962;McGeorge & Burton, 1989;Stinessen;1985). There is also evidence that a request to provide a rationale or to write a justification for a prospective choice can aid decision making (Miller & Fagley, 1991;Sieck & Yates, 1997). A possible explanation of these findings is that the act of translating thoughts into words increases the degree to which people search for and process information relevant to their situations.…”