2020
DOI: 10.1111/caje.12457
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Exposing false advertising

Abstract: Countries rely on different public and private agents to enforce consumer protection and fair competition regulations. To analyze the repercussions of different regimes on social welfare, we consider the possibility of false advertising by a firm in an environment with duopolistic competition and with consumers who can be rational or naïve regarding the trustworthiness of advertising claims. We compare the incentives for and outcomes of false advertisement verification and injunction requests made by one of th… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1

Citation Types

0
2
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6

Relationship

0
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 6 publications
(2 citation statements)
references
References 41 publications
0
2
0
Order By: Relevance
“…For example, Barigozzi et al (2009) look at how (potentially false) comparative advertising by a new entrant can help it compete with an established incumbent. Meanwhile Drugov and Troya-Martinez (2019) examine how a firm can make its false claims vaguer such that it is harder for an authority to convict it, whilst Baumann and Rasch (2020) study the differing incentives of private and public bodies to pursue firms suspected of engaging in false advertising. that fake reviews were mainly for low-quality products and were successful in boosting their sales rank.…”
Section: Empiricsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Barigozzi et al (2009) look at how (potentially false) comparative advertising by a new entrant can help it compete with an established incumbent. Meanwhile Drugov and Troya-Martinez (2019) examine how a firm can make its false claims vaguer such that it is harder for an authority to convict it, whilst Baumann and Rasch (2020) study the differing incentives of private and public bodies to pursue firms suspected of engaging in false advertising. that fake reviews were mainly for low-quality products and were successful in boosting their sales rank.…”
Section: Empiricsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This notion of naivete (which is also implied in our model) has been formalized by Eyster and Rabin [2005], who use the term "cursedness" for this type of irrationality. Market interactions under cursedness have been studied by, e.g., Baumann and Rasch [2017] and .…”
Section: Naivetementioning
confidence: 99%