2019
DOI: 10.1109/tcns.2018.2844244
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EXPOSE the Line Failures Following a Cyber-Physical Attack on the Power Grid

Abstract: Recent attacks on power grids demonstrated the vulnerability of the grids to cyber and physical attacks. To analyze this vulnerability, we study cyber-physical attacks that affect both the power grid physical infrastructure and its underlying Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. We assume that an adversary attacks an area by: (i) disconnecting some lines within that area, and (ii) obstructing the information (e.g., status of the lines and voltage measurements) from within the area to reach … Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…LR attacks are launched by false load data to affect system operation schedules. The tempered load meter reading deviates from the real reading and thus system operators make decisions based on the falsified load demand [18][19][20][21]. Consequently, this can cause economic loss and physical damages to the equipment.…”
Section: Modelling Of Load Redistribution Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…LR attacks are launched by false load data to affect system operation schedules. The tempered load meter reading deviates from the real reading and thus system operators make decisions based on the falsified load demand [18][19][20][21]. Consequently, this can cause economic loss and physical damages to the equipment.…”
Section: Modelling Of Load Redistribution Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…State estimation is a significant approach to filter and detect FDI in case that it misleads the operation and control of power systems by inferring with metered operational parameters [16][17][18]. However, it is vulnerable to malicious attacks [9,19], such as load redistribution (LR).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [12], a heuristic algorithm was proposed to handle cyber attacks that distort sensor data or inject stealthy data. Moreover, [13] modified the algorithm and the theoretical guarantees in [2] according to the AC power flow model. However, the above works were all based on the assumption that the power grid remained connected after the failures, which may not be true under multi-link failures [4].…”
Section: A Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Each sequence consists of (i) a fully observable [T − 1]-long time series containing the power and voltage phasors for all nodes (i.e., s(τ ) and v(τ ) for τ ∈ {t − 1 − T, • • • , t − 1}), (ii) a partially observable time step containing N s (t) power phasors, s(t), and (iii) a corresponding target voltage vector, v(t). Each power and voltage component (real and imaginary) in the data set was standardized using the mean and the standard deviation obtained from the training set 4 . An illustration of the full datapreparation scheme is depicted in Fig.…”
Section: A Experimental Design and Data Preparationmentioning
confidence: 99%