Exploring the relationship between corporate ESG performance and corporate violation: Based on the fraud triangle theory

Abstract

Enterprises should strive for sustainable development since it is a vital component of the economy. Sustainable development serves as a safeguard against elements that might negatively impact the future development of their companies. This article aims to explore the influence of corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance on corporate violation using Chinese A‐share listed firms as a sample. We discover that corporate ESG performance considerably discourages corporate violation behavior, reducing the risk of corporate violations. Based on the fraud triangle theory, we also show that corporate ESG performance reduces the opportunity of corporate violations by improving information transparency, reduces the pressure of corporate violations by alleviating financing constraints, and reduces the rationalization of corporate violations by increasing media attention. By examining particular corporate violations, we document that corporate ESG performance is more effective for disclosure violations and general violations in corporate governance. Further analysis shows that corporate ESG performance has a considerable impact on companies in nonstate‐owned and small‐company subsamples. These results add to the literature and provide theoretical insights for governors, regulators, company executives, auditors, and other stakeholders.