Exploring the IEEE Standard C37.118–2005 Synchrophasors for Power Systems

Martin, Ken; Hamai, D.; Adamiak, Mark; Anderson, S.; Begović, Miroslav; Benmouyal, G.; Brunello, G.; Bürger, Jens; Cai, J.Y.; Dickerson, Bill; Gharpure, V. S.; Kennedy, B. W.; Karlsson, Daniel; Phadke, A.G.; Salj, J.; Skendžić, V.; Sperr, J.; Song, Yi; Huntley, C. R.; Kasztenny, B.; Price, Elmo

doi:10.1109/tpwrd.2007.916092

Cited by 176 publications

(101 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…IEEE developed the IEEE 1344 standard which was improved over the time and ultimately replaced by IEEE C37.118-2. Martin et al (2008) explains the evolution of IEEE standards and highlights the key improvements over time. The IEEE C37.118-2 has several limitations including (i) lack of security mechanism, (ii) limited interoperability and integration support and (iii) no defined transport protocol and multicast features.…”

Section: Synchrophasor Technologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Threat Analysis of BlackEnergy Malware for Synchrophasor based Real-time Control and Monitoring in Smart Grid

Khan

Maynard

McLaughlin

et al. 2016

Electronic Workshops in Computing

117

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The BlackEnergy malware targeting critical infrastructures has a long history. It evolved over time from a simple DDoS platform to a quite sophisticated plug-in based malware. The plug-in architecture has a persistent malware core with easily installable attack specific modules for DDoS, spamming, info-stealing, remote access, boot-sector formatting etc. BlackEnergy has been involved in several high profile cyber physical attacks including the recent Ukraine power grid attack in December 2015. This paper investigates the evolution of BlackEnergy and its cyber attack capabilities. It presents a basic cyber attack model used by BlackEnergy for targeting industrial control systems. In particular, the paper analyzes cyber threats of BlackEnergy for synchrophasor based systems which are used for real-time control and monitoring functionalities in smart grid. Several BlackEnergy based attack scenarios have been investigated by exploiting the vulnerabilities in two widely used synchrophasor communication standards: (i) IEEE C37.118 and (ii) IEC 61850-90-5. Specifically, the paper addresses reconnaissance, DDoS, man-in-the-middle and replay/reflection attacks on IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5. Further, the paper also investigates protection strategies for detection and prevention of BlackEnergy based cyber physical attacks.

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Section: Synchrophasor Technologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Threat Analysis of BlackEnergy Malware for Synchrophasor based Real-time Control and Monitoring in Smart Grid

Khan

Maynard

McLaughlin

et al. 2016

Electronic Workshops in Computing

117

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…IEEE C37.118-2 evolved probably as the first most successful communication standard. It was originally based on IEEE 1344 standard and its evolution is explained in [3]. The authors have also highlighted key differences between old and new versions and introduced several applications for IEEE C37.118-2 standard.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

IEEE C37.118-2 Synchrophasor Communication Framework - Overview, Cyber Vulnerabilities Analysis and Performance Evaluation

Khan¹,

McLaughlin²,

Laverty³

et al. 2016

Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy

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Abstract-Synchrophasors have become an important part of the modern power system and numerous applications have been developed covering wide-area monitoring, protection and control. Most applications demand continuous transmission of synchrophasor data across large geographical areas and require an efficient communication framework. IEEE C37.118-2 evolved as one of the most successful synchrophasor communication standards and is widely adopted. However, it lacks a predefined security mechanism and is highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. This paper analyzes different types of cyber attacks on IEEE C37.118-2 communication system and evaluates their possible impact on any developed synchrophasor application. Further, the paper also recommends an efficent security mechanism that can provide strong protection against cyber attacks. Although, IEEE C37.118-2 has been widely adopted, there is no clear understanding of the requirements and limitations. To this aim, the paper also presents detailed performance evaluation of IEEE C37.118-2 implementations which could help determine required resources and network characteristics before designing any synchrophasor application.

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“…IEEE published a series of standards that were revised over time. Authors in [5] explained the evolution of IEEE C37.118 from IEEE 1344 and also highlighted key differences between old and new versions. Similarly, IEC 61850-90-5 originally evolved from IEC 61850 in 2012.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Initially published in 2005, IEEE C37.118 emerged as the most successful synchrophasor communication framework and is widely adopted [5]. However, research still lacks a proper analysis of its requirements, limitations and security challenges.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 synchrophasor communication frameworks

Khan

McLaughlin

Laverty

et al. 2016

2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)

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Exploring the IEEE Standard C37.118–2005 Synchrophasors for Power Systems

Cited by 176 publications

References 7 publications

Threat Analysis of BlackEnergy Malware for Synchrophasor based Real-time Control and Monitoring in Smart Grid

Threat Analysis of BlackEnergy Malware for Synchrophasor based Real-time Control and Monitoring in Smart Grid

IEEE C37.118-2 Synchrophasor Communication Framework - Overview, Cyber Vulnerabilities Analysis and Performance Evaluation

Analysis of IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5 synchrophasor communication frameworks

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