2011
DOI: 10.1007/s10472-011-9250-1
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Exploring the boundary of half-positionality

Abstract: Half positionality is the property of a language of infinite words to admit positional winning strategies, when interpreted as the goal of a two-player game on a graph. Such problem applies to the automatic synthesis of controllers, where positional strategies represent efficient controllers. As our main result, we present a novel sufficient condition for half positionality, more general than what was previously known. Moreover, we compare our proposed condition with several others, proposed in the recent lite… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1
1

Citation Types

0
10
0

Year Published

2014
2014
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
3
2

Relationship

0
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 8 publications
(10 citation statements)
references
References 13 publications
(32 reference statements)
0
10
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Albeit close, this is distinct from the half-positional determinacy result from [BFMM11, Theorem 3], which gives sufficient conditions about a winning condition for a player to admit memoryless optimal strategies on every two-player arena -in Theorem 3.8, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for a player to admit UFM strategies on his oneplayer arenas only. The sufficient conditions from [BFMM11] (strong monotony and strong concavity) imply M triv -monotony and M triv -selectivity, but not the other way around. Given a preference relation, it is possible for a player to have UFM strategies on his one-player arenas, but not on all two-player arenas: e.g., the example used in [BFMM11,Lemma 15].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 98%
See 4 more Smart Citations
“…Albeit close, this is distinct from the half-positional determinacy result from [BFMM11, Theorem 3], which gives sufficient conditions about a winning condition for a player to admit memoryless optimal strategies on every two-player arena -in Theorem 3.8, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for a player to admit UFM strategies on his oneplayer arenas only. The sufficient conditions from [BFMM11] (strong monotony and strong concavity) imply M triv -monotony and M triv -selectivity, but not the other way around. Given a preference relation, it is possible for a player to have UFM strategies on his one-player arenas, but not on all two-player arenas: e.g., the example used in [BFMM11,Lemma 15].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…The sufficient conditions from [BFMM11] (strong monotony and strong concavity) imply M triv -monotony and M triv -selectivity, but not the other way around. Given a preference relation, it is possible for a player to have UFM strategies on his one-player arenas, but not on all two-player arenas: e.g., the example used in [BFMM11,Lemma 15]. In such an example, Theorem 3.8 could be applied, but not the result from [BFMM11].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 98%
See 3 more Smart Citations