Exploring Subjective Representationalism

Abstract

Representationalism is, roughly, the view that experiencing is to be analyzed wholly in terms of representing. But what sorts of properties are represented in experience? According to a prominent form of representationalism, objective representationalism, experiences represent only objective (i.e. suitably mind‐independent) properties. I explore subjective representationalism, the view that experiences represent at least some subjective (i.e. suitably mind‐dependent) properties. Subjective representationalists, but not objective representationalists, can accommodate cases of illusion‐free phenomenal inversion. Moreover, subjective representationalism captures the so‐called transparency of experience, as it is standardly articulated, just as well as objective representationalism.

The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience

“…Such an approach encounters well-21 I in fact prefer the subtly different view, explored in Mehta (2012), that phenomenal character is composed wholly of centered properties, which, roughly speaking, are de se analogues of ordinary properties. However, I will ignore that wrinkle here, since the motivations for that view are orthogonal to the current debate, and the coming arguments will go the same way regardless.…”

A puzzle about the experience of left and right

“…2323Views closely related to Shoemaker's are defended by Prinz (2006), Kriegel (2003), and Mehta (2012). …”