Exploring RSA Performance up to 4096-bit for Fast Security Processing on a Flexible Instruction Set Architecture Processor

Marchesan, Gregory Calegari; Weirich, Nelson R.; Culau, Eduardo C.; Weber, Iacana; Moraes, Fernando; Carara, Everton Alceu; Oliveira, Leonardo Londero de

doi:10.1109/icecs.2018.8617840

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…It is important to point out that this paper concentrates on private-key ciphers, yet there are numerous studies that have concentrated on the implementation of public-key algorithms and their ability to withstand attacks from third parties. As evidence of this, there have been studies on effective executions of public-key algorithms such as the elliptic curve and RSA [ 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 ], as well as theoretical attacks [ 13 , 14 , 15 ]. Consequently, this study concentrates on the implementation of a security system on private-key encryption systems, while public-key encryption systems are not included.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting FPGA-Based Cryptohardware Implementations from Fault Attacks Using ADCs

Potestad-Ordóñez,

Casado-Galán,

Tena-Sánchez

2024

Sensors

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The majority of data exchanged between connected devices are confidential and must be protected against unauthorized access. To ensure data protection, so-called cryptographic algorithms are used. These algorithms have proven to be mathematically secure against brute force due to the key length, but their physical implementations are vulnerable against physical attacks. The physical implementation of these algorithms can result in the disclosure of information that can be used to access confidential data. Some of the most powerful hardware attacks presented in the literature are called fault injection attacks. These attacks involve introducing a malfunction into the normal operation of the device and then analyzing the data obtained by comparing them with the expected behavior. Some of the most common methods for injecting faults are the variation of the supply voltage and temperature or the injection of electromagnetic pulses. In this paper, a hardware design methodology using analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) is presented to detect attacks on cryptocircuits and prevent information leakage during fault injection attacks. To assess the effectiveness of the proposed design approach, FPGA-based ADC modules were designed that detect changes in temperature and supply voltage. Two setups were implemented to test the scheme against voltage and temperature variations and injections of electromagnetic pulses. The results obtained demonstrate that, in 100% of the cases, when the correct operating voltage and temperature range were established, the detectors could activate an alarm signal when the cryptographic module was attacked, thus avoiding confidential information leakage and protecting data from being exploited.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting FPGA-Based Cryptohardware Implementations from Fault Attacks Using ADCs

Potestad-Ordóñez,

Casado-Galán,

Tena-Sánchez

2024

Sensors

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“…It should be noted that there are many works that study public key encryption implementations and analyze their robustness against different attacks. As a brief example for the reader, efficient implementations of public key algorithms (ECC and RSA) are presented in [14][15][16][17], and theoretical attacks are described in [18][19][20]. Due to the great number of encryption systems that exist, as mentioned above, at this point we focus on the analysis of private key ciphers because public key ciphers are out of our scope.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Breaking Trivium Stream Cipher Implemented in ASIC Using Experimental Attacks and DFA

Potestad-Ordonez

Barrero

Oliva

et al. 2020

Sensors

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One of the best methods to improve the security of cryptographic systems used to exchange sensitive information is to attack them to find their vulnerabilities and to strengthen them in subsequent designs. Trivium stream cipher is one of the lightweight ciphers designed for security applications in the Internet of things (IoT). In this paper, we present a complete setup to attack ASIC implementations of Trivium which allows recovering the secret keys using the active non-invasive technique attack of clock manipulation, combined with Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) cryptanalysis. The attack system is able to inject effective transient faults into the Trivium in a clock cycle and sample the faulty output. Then, the internal state of the Trivium is recovered using the DFA cryptanalysis through the comparison between the correct and the faulty outputs. Finally, a backward version of Trivium was also designed to go back and get the secret keys from the initial internal states. The key recovery has been verified with numerous simulations data attacks and used with the experimental data obtained from the Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) Trivium. The secret key of the Trivium were recovered experimentally in 100% of the attempts, considering a real scenario and minimum assumptions.

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“…Asymmetric cryptography is more secured than symmetric cryptography, but it is complex and uses much longer keys which in turn makes it slower and not industry-accepted, and not suitable for bulk data transmission than its counterpart symmetric cryptography. However, research is going on for the improvement of the performance of the asymmetric cryptography algorithm [2][3][4][5][6]. On the other hand, symmetric cryptography is less complex and executes faster than asymmetric cryptography, and so it has been accepted as an industry-standard cryptographic algorithm and is being widely used to secure sensitive, secret, or classified information in government, healthcare, banking, and other industries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Exploring RSA Performance up to 4096-bit for Fast Security Processing on a Flexible Instruction Set Architecture Processor

Cited by 9 publications

References 19 publications

Protecting FPGA-Based Cryptohardware Implementations from Fault Attacks Using ADCs

Protecting FPGA-Based Cryptohardware Implementations from Fault Attacks Using ADCs

Breaking Trivium Stream Cipher Implemented in ASIC Using Experimental Attacks and DFA

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