Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn from the Industrial Organization Approach?

Abstract

This article conducts a detailed analysis of the concept of economic dependence and exploitative abuse based on how their treatment in competition law and economics and their enforcement in European case law have evolved. Although the theoretical roots of these concepts lie in economic theory, these issues have been ignored or considered only scantily in the context of competition law enforcement. An effects-based approach should take these problems into account and could provide insights into how to portray the impacts of these abuses. We draw on two examples-from the agri-food industries and the digital economy-of relevant economic dependence issues. This paper highlights the existence of a paradox: although industrial organization models provide relevant tools to characterize these abuses, assess their effects, and devise remedies, it seems that they are seldom used by competition law enforcers.

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