Explication as a strategy for revisionary philosophy

Kitsik, Eve

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1774-z

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 15 publications

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“…Carnapian (1962) explication is counts as a precursor to contemporary conceptual engineering because it revises the folk concept instead of analysing it. (Kitsik, 2020) Explication takes inexact contradictory folk concepts and replaces them with precise scientific concepts. An example by Carnap is that the concept fish has been explicated to exclude whales, which is revisionary and not just analysis.…”

Section: Objections and Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Engineering virtue: constructionist virtue ethics

Ohlhorst

2023

Inquiry

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Virtue ethics is traditionally a conservative project. It analyses the virtues that humanity has been relying on since antiquity. This conservatism unduly limits the potential of virtue ethics to contribute to moral progress.Instead, we should pay more attention to constructionist virtue ethics with the help of conceptual engineering. I will argue that revising and ameliorating the virtue concepts which a community uses directly and indirectly leads to a change of the virtues that exist in this community. By revising and innovating virtue concepts, we can re-make and improve the virtues that we have.

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Section: Objections and Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Engineering virtue: constructionist virtue ethics

Ohlhorst

2023

Inquiry

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Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality

Eder

2021

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A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My position thus amounts to an instrumentalist position about theories of epistemic rationality. Since there are different purposes, or goals, for which theories of rationality are proposed, the method of explication leaves room for different characterizations of rationality. I focus on two such (kinds of) purposes: first, the purpose of guiding the formation (or maintenance) of doxastic states and, second, the purpose of assessing (the formation or maintenance of) doxastic states. I conclude by outlining a pluralistic picture concerning rationality.

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Reformulating Philosophical Methodology or Rebuilding Our Picture of Philosophy

Love

2022

Analysis

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Explication as a strategy for revisionary philosophy

Cited by 4 publications

References 15 publications

Engineering virtue: constructionist virtue ethics

Engineering virtue: constructionist virtue ethics

Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality

Reformulating Philosophical Methodology or Rebuilding Our Picture of Philosophy

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