Explanatory Coherence and Belief Revision in Naive Physics

Ranney, Michael; Thagard, Paul

doi:10.21236/ada201093

Cited by 45 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…amples that are superficially similar to the problem but that do not share the same solution or solution structure (Reed, Ackinc1ose, & Voss, 1990;Ross, 1987Ross, , 1989. For example, Ranney and Thagard (1988;see also Caramazza, McCloskey, & Green, 1981) reported that some people predicted that a pendulum bob would follow a curved path, rather than falling straight down, if it was released at the top of the pendulum's arc. This answer was partially based on people's erroneous recall of children jumping from swings; they seemed to forget, or not notice, that children jump before the swing reaches the top of its arc.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning about curvilinear motion: Using principles or analogy

et al. 1995

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People possess implicit theories about the motion of objects, theories that are often incorrect. When asked to predict the path of an object emerging from a curved tube, for example, people often say that the object will continue to follow a curved path. However, when solving a problem that reminds them of a familiar previous instance, people often reason by analogy to the instance. In this study, we show that a previous instance must be very superficially similar to a problem in order to be used as an analogy; otherwise, people will use their implicit theories as the basis of their reasoning.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning about curvilinear motion: Using principles or analogy

et al. 1995

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“…There is still a debate in the literature as to whether impetus notions present a consistent belief system (e.g., McCloskey, 1983) or whether they are just the result of a fragmented and situational understanding of physical phenomena (e.g., diSessa, 1983(e.g., diSessa, , 1988Ranney, 1988Ranney, , 1994. For instance, Ranney and Thagard (1988) found that the same participant might give responses reflecting different motion models (impetus or Newtonian) to different problems, with no correlation of response types across problems (see also Cooke &Breedin, 1994, andRanney's, 1994, commentary). That is, people may hold impetus beliefs for McCloskey's curved tube problem, while at the same time giving Newtonian responses regarding horizontal projectile motion.…”

Section: Naive Physics Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: Dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge about motion

Kozhevnikov

Hegarty

2001

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

122

135

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We examined the extent to which findings from the literature on naive physics and representational momentum studies are consistent with impetus beliefs postulating imparted internal energy as a source of motion. In a literature review, we showed that, for situations in which impetus theory and physical principles make different predictions, representationalmomentum effects are consistent with impetus beliefs. In three new experiments, we examined people's implicit and explicit knowledge of the effect of mass on the rate of ascending motion. The results suggest that implicit knowledge is consistent with impetus theory and is unaffected by explicit knowledge. Expert physicists, whose explicit knowledge is in accord with Newtonian principles, exhibited the same implicit impetus beliefs as novices when asked to respond in a representational momentum paradigm. We propose that, in situations in which an immediate response is required and one does not have specific contextual knowledge about an object's motion, both physics experts and novices apply impetus principles as a default heuristic.

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“…In some studies, major belief change takes more time and shows up only over years as students acquire additional knowledge (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1988; Chinn & Brewer Anomalous Data -12 Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). In other studies, some theory change in response to anomalous data occurs within one or a few experimental sessions or within several classroom lessons (e.g., Alvermann & Hynd, 1989;Brown & Clement, 1989;Burbules & Linn, 1988;Dunbar & Schunn, 1990;Johsua & Dupin, 1987;Levin, Siegler, Druyan, & Gardosh, 1990;Ranney & Thagard, 1988;Rowell & Dawson, 1983;Zietsman & Hewson, 1986). For example, Rowell and Dawson (1983) found that 3 of 12 subjects who held a weight theory of water displacement changed to a volume theory after observing anomalous data that supported the volume theory.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Role of Anomalous Data in Knowledge Acquisition: A Theoretical Framework and Implications for Science Instruction

Chinn¹,

Brewer

1993

Review of Educational Research

993

351

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Understanding how science students respond to anomalous data is essential to understanding knowledge acquisition in science classrooms. In this report, we present a detailed analysis of the ways in which scientists and science students respond to anomalous data. We postulate that there are seven distinct forms of response to anomalous data, only one of which is to accept the data and change theories. The other six responses involve discounting the data in various ways in order to protect the preinstructional theory. We analyze the factors that influence which of these seven forms of response a scientist or student will choose, giving special attention to the factors that make theory change more likely. Finally, we discuss the implications of our framework for science instruction.Anomalous Data -2 THE ROLE OF ANOMALOUS DATA IN KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE INSTRUCTIONThis report addresses an issue that is crucial for understanding how people learn science and how to improve science instruction: How do students respond when they encounter scientific information that contradicts their current theories' about the physical world? In other words, how do students respond when their current beliefs about the physical world conflict with the information presented during science instruction?This issue is crucial for two reasons. The first is that encountering contradictory information is a very common occurrence when one is learning science. Science students' preinstructional beliefs about the natural world often conflict sharply with many of the accepted scientific theories they are taught in school, and this is true across a wide variety of domains within biology, chemistry, and physics (for reviews, see Carey, 1985;Champagne, Klopfer, & Gunstone, 1982;Confrey, 1990;Driver & Easley, 1978; Driver, Guesne, & Tiberghien, 1985;Eylon & Linn, 1988;Osborne & Freyberg, 1985;Perkins & Simmons, 1988;Roth, 1990). Thus, the encounter with contradictory information is at the heart of knowledge acquisition in science.The second reason why understanding how students respond to contradictory information is crucial for science education is that students typically resist giving up their preinstructional beliefs. Instead of abandoning or modifying their preinstructional beliefs in the face of new, conflicting data and ideas, students often staunchly maintain old ideas and reject or distort new ideas. For instance, some children who are told that the earth is round preserve their preinstructional belief that the earth is flat by concluding that the earth is disc shaped (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Similarly, children can spend days or weeks studying photosynthesis and yet persist in their preinstructional belief that plants get their food from the soil (Anderson & Smith, 1984). And a number of researchers have found that many young adults go through high school and university physics courses without ever giving up their pre-Newtonian views of motion (e.g., Champagne, Klopfer, & Anderson...

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Explanatory Coherence and Belief Revision in Naive Physics

Cited by 45 publications

References 7 publications

Reasoning about curvilinear motion: Using principles or analogy

Reasoning about curvilinear motion: Using principles or analogy

Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: Dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge about motion

The Role of Anomalous Data in Knowledge Acquisition: A Theoretical Framework and Implications for Science Instruction

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