Explanation classification depends on understanding: extending the epistemic side-effect effect

Abstract

Our goal in this paper is to experimentally investigate whether folk conceptions of explanation are psychologistic. In particular, are people more likely to classify speech acts as explanations when they cause understanding in their recipient? The empirical evidence that we present suggests this is so. Using the sideeffect effect as a marker of mental state ascriptions, we argue that lay judgments of explanatory status are mediated by judgments of a speaker's and/or audience's mental states. First, we show that attributions of both understanding and explanation exhibit a side-effect effect. Next, we show that when the speaker's and audience's level of understanding is stipulated, the explanation side-effect effect goes away entirely.These results not only extend the side-effect effect to attributions of understanding, they also suggest that attributions of explanation exhibit a side-effect effect because they depend upon attributions of understanding, supporting the idea that folk conceptions of explanation are psychologistic.

Theoretical Virtues: Do Scientists Think What Philosophers Think They Ought to Think?

“…Experimental methods have been employed in several subfields of philosophy since the early 2000s (Knobe and Nichols 2017). Although there were early attempts to use experimental methods in the philosophy of science (Stotz and Griffiths 2004;Stotz 2009), experimental methods have been embraced more widely only in more recent years (Schupbach 2011;Waskan et al 2014;Douven and Schupbach 2015;Steel et al 2017;Chall et al 2021;Mättig and Stöltzner 2019;Robinson et al 2019;Beebe and Dellsén 2020;Wilkenfeld and Lombrozo 2020;Mizrahi, forthcoming). This paper is a contribution to this recent wave in experimental philosophy of science.…”

Helping Others to Understand: A Normative Account of the Speech Act of Explanation

“… 25 The recent empirical work indicates that scientists and laypeople alike consider a speech act to be an explanation when it provides an understanding to the audience (Waskan et al 2014 ; Wilkenfeld and Lombrozo 2020 ). Wilkenfeld and Lombrozo ( 2020 , p. 2590) conclude that “… there is strong reason to believe not only that explanations are judged by the extent to which they produce some mental state (namely understanding), but that understanding is sufficient to play this mental state role.” Some may think that this conclusion goes against my proposal. However, Wilkenfeld ( 2014 ) shows that even though some explanations do not generate understanding, they are judged as explanations nevertheless (albeit can be judged as defective).…”