Explaining the timeliness of implementation of truth commission recommendations

Abstract

Truth commissions are widely seen as important peacebuilding tools partially because they issue recommendations that seek to prompt further justice initiatives to address past abuses and promote institutional reforms that encourage non-repetition. Yet, despite growing interest in truth commissions among academics, policymakers, and activists, little attention has been paid to the recommendations that they outline in their final reports. In this article, we examine the factors that shape whether and when truth commission recommendations are enacted. Thus, we seek to explain not only whether recommendations are implemented, but also how quickly they are implemented. We use survival analysis to test the effects of a range of political and economic country-level variables, commission-specific qualities, and recommendation characteristics on the implementation record of nearly 700 recommendations formulated by ten Latin American truth commissions that operated between 1984 and 2014. The analysis yields interesting results, including that implementation proceeds more quickly in wealthier countries and when recommendations are issued by commissions created immediately after transitions, when the transitions occurred in which one side was victorious, and when commissions are created by an executive order. Moreover, recommendations that are directed towards the past are implemented more slowly than future-oriented measures.

Truth commissions in the established democracies of the Global North: Theoretical and practical perspectives

“…Just as importantly, studies should determine the degree to which different types of recommendations are being implemented in the countries of the Global North, and the conditions under which symbolic and structural recommendations are more likely to be implemented. While implementation is a neglected area in the broader literature on truth commissions (Martín et al., 2022; Skaar, 2019), it is virtually non‐existent for commissions in the Global North (although see Jewell & Mosby, 2022).…”

“…As part of the final report, recommendations can be a particularly important legacy of truth commissions, as they can help to set the national agenda (Ensalaco, 1994). Indeed, through recommendations truth commissions can urge continued efforts to address the past whether through reparations, apologies, and/or memorials, or they can advo cate for reform in a wide range of institutions including policing, education, and the judiciary with the goal of changing social practices and norms, and preventing future violations (Martín et al, 2022;Skaar, 2019). Yet, the literature suggests that implementation of recommendations is a fluid and non-linear process (see Skaar, 2019), and there are no guarantees they will be implemented (Yusuf, 2021; see also Martín et al, 2022;Rojas et al, 2022).…”

“…As indicated, most truth commissions are created because governments in transitional societies feel compelled to do so (Zvobgo, 2020). The literature also recognizes, though, that political elites make strategic calculations and truth commissions can be self‐serving (James, 2012; Marti'n et al., 2022; McAulifee, 2017; although see Wiebelhaus‐Brahm, 2021).…”