Explaining the Relationship Between Class Position and Political Preferences: A Long-Term Panel Analysis of Intra-Generational Class Mobility

Abstract

Past findings on the connection between class position and political preferences are overwhelmingly derived from cross-sectional studies, which provided a limited basis for inferring causality. This study uses long-term panel data on thousands of British respondents to measure the impact of intra-generational class mobility across a range of political identities and preferences. Upward class mobility leads to small increases in economic conservatism, but party choice, class identity and attitudes to non-economic issues do not change. This updating of economic values is much smaller than cross-sectional differences between classes. These results are consistent with the short-run effects of class mobility operating primarily through a limited economic self-interest mechanism. Beliefs that are plausibly unconnected to economics are unaffected. The overall association between class and a range of identities, opinions and preferences is therefore more likely to be caused by early life experiences and longer-term socialization than by the immediate material interests associated with jobs.

Testing Negative: The Non-Consequences of COVID-19 on Mass Ideology

“…More recently, a wave of studies (summarised in Margalit ( 2019)) have been published using panel data tracking individuals over time. A number find at least some evidence that preferences are updated (Ares 2020;Langsaether et al 2020;Naumann et al 2016;Owens and Pedulla 2014;Pahontu 2021). Others, however, find that any updating is only small, short-lived, or confined to certain groups, or may occur only in response to large changes in circumstances (Lerman and McCabe 2017;Margalit 2013;Marten 2019;O'Grady 2019;Stegmueller 2013;Wehl 2020).…”

Measuring objective and subjective class: the effects of survey questionnaires on the study of class voting

“…Thus, despite the decline of the magnitude of differences between social classes, the order in which different strata favour left or right parties is still consistent with the class voting literature (Jansen, Evans, and Graaf 2013, 72). Similarly, empirical evidence shows a persistent association between social class and political preferences (Ares 2020;Langsaether 2019;Langsaether, Evans, and O'Grady 2021).…”

Cabinet ministers and inequality

“…Finally, unlike sociocultural professionals, working‐class ministers might be less representative of their class than it is often assumed because they have experienced a substantial upward movement in the class hierarchy. Two recent studies that analyse the effect of class mobility on respondents’ economic preferences found that upward class mobility is associated with a modest decline in the progressivity of economic preferences (Ares, 2020; Langsæther et al., 2021). The heterogenous political preferences of the working class have also become manifest in the decline of the working‐class vote to social democratic parties.…”

“…Second, cabinet ministers might not fully represent their social class since by the time they are appointed to the cabinet, they have spent, on average, 10 years as members of parliament. People's economic preferences become more conservative as they climb the class ladder, particularly when they move up from working class to professional occupations (Ares, 2020; Langsæther et al., 2021). In addition, these politicians are bound to be amongst the most ambitious compared with the backbenchers (Allen et al., 2020).…”