Explaining the Failure of Thailand's Anti‐corruption Regime

Abstract

Despite the presence of strong anti‐corruption policies, state and regulatory capture may persist and thrive in the highest echelons of government. This article explores such a case, that of Thailand under former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The author argues that the primary explanation for this contradiction lies in Thailand's post‐1997 anti‐corruption framework. Because of the ascendancy of a business–politics nexus more powerful in blocking reform than Thai constitutional drafters had anticipated, and because of the decline in political contestability as a result of Thaksin's control of both the legislature and the executive, the stage was set for a dramatic increase in the levels of state capture. The author suggests that effective control of such political corruption calls for a strategy which extends far beyond the technocratic approaches used by Thai reformers in the mid to late 1990s.

Geographically uneven landscapes of Asian corruption

“…In Thailand, vote-buying casts doubt on the validity of the electoral process (Callahan 2005;Mutebi 2008). Petty corruption is endemic in Myanmar, as well as bribes of tax collectors and customs officials; monies intended for NGOs are often siphoned off (Saw 2015).…”

Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research

“…The seminal book on corruption in Thailand is by Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan (1996); a more recent study on corruption and patronage is by Phongpaichit and Baker (2004). Mutebi (2008) argues that corruption in Thailand could thrive despite an existing comprehensive anticorruption mechanism because a 'powerful business-politics nexus' could capture key regulatory processes and because contestability was low as Premier Thaksin held a comfortable majority in legislature and controlled the executive. Quah (2001) describes the Singapore success story: Corruption was virtually eradicated through a substantial increase in civil service salaries and other accompanying measures.…”

The IMF, the World Bank, and the Global Economic Crisis: Exploring Paradigm Continuity

“…Thailand followed a more variegated route. Sweeping banking reforms were not matched in domains such as corporate governance and anti‐corruption despite IMF pressure, whereas in social policy and public administration the government adopted a selective approach based on party‐political considerations (Dixon, 2004; Mutebi, 2008; Painter, 2006). Mexico's ‘second generation’ reforms displayed a similarly selective pattern, although Mexican policy makers did engage in ambitious bureaucratic reforms (Panizza and Philip, 2005) and have been experimenting with IFI‐supported social programmes with modest outcomes (Sewall, 2008).…”