Explaining the evolution of Turkey’s diaspora engagement policy: a holistic approach

Abstract

This article provides a comprehensive framework to explain why Turkey has adopted a pro-active diaspora agenda since the early 2000s. It shows that Turkey's diaspora policy is the result of an amalgamation of domestic, transnational, and international factors: Domestically, the AKP's rise to power resulted in drastic economic and political reforms and the promotion of a new identity based on neo-Ottomanism and Sunni-Muslim nationalism. These developments have transformed Turkey's state-diaspora relations. The 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 failed coup attempt also played a role. Transnationally, Turkish expatriates' growing socioeconomic and political clout in their host countries, as evidenced by the mushrooming of political parties founded by Turks in Europe, has urged Turkey to reconsider the efficacy of its diaspora as a source of influence abroad as well as a noteworthy electorate in national elections. Various international events have also shaped Turkey's new diaspora agenda, including Turkey's increasing bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU since the early 2000s, particularly after the European refugee crisis, and the rise of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 era. I suggest that domestic factors have played the most significant role in shaping Turkey's diaspora agenda. I examine the domestic dimension both as an independent factor and also in relation to transnational and international factors. The configuration of a new political elite has changed the ways in which Turkey interacts with its transnational diaspora and perceives its international position vis-à-vis European countries. The findings of the article draw on official statements and documents, semistructured in-depth interviews conducted with Turkish officials, the Euro-Turks Barometer Survey, and news sources.

Political Regimes and External Voting Rights: A Cross-National Comparison

“…As indicated, the AKP has benefited greatly from nonresident voters, particularly labor migrants. This included launching its overseas mobilization efforts as part of its new diaspora policy, as soon as it acquired the power as ruling party in 2002 via the party's overseas satellites, such as the lobbying institution International Democrats (Uluslararası Demokratlar Birligi, UID), state institutions including the Turkish missions abroad, the Office for the Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlıgı, YTB), and other organizations including the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyaneṫ Işleri Türkİslam Birligi, DITIB) (Adamson, 2018;Sahin Mencutek and Baser, 2018;Yanasmayan and Kaşlı, 2019;Arkilic, 2020). The activities of these organizations included but were not limited to reaching out to the addresses of the electorates, canvassing and registering the DITIB members to the electoral role, and most significantly providing free regular shuttle bus services to vote (Yener-Roderburg 2020).…”

A Content Analysis of the Friday Sermons of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs in Germany (DİTİB)

“…With Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's election, this has slowly reversed and the criticism that he propagates a less progressive Islam has increased (Karaveli 2016). The engagement of Turkey with its diaspora has intensified since his election, for instance, due to the weight of immigrant votes in Turkish elections, a perceived need to protect them from Islamophobia and Turkey's bargaining power when it comes to visa freedom in exchange for hosting refugees (Maritato 2018; Arkilic 2021). Part of this diaspora engagement was the revision of citizenship rights, which meant that the diaspora had rights but also duties (Yanasmayan and Kaşlı 2019).…”

Emigration and the Transnationalization of Sending States’ Welfare Regimes

“…The first electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) in 2002, has given a new turn to Turkey's diaspora engagement (Arkilic, 2021). It is particularly visible at the institutional level; with institutions being created (i.e., the Office for the Turks Abroad and Related Communities [YTB]) or expanded (i.e., consular network) and non-state organizations receiving public support (i.e., the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs [DITIB]) (Adamson, 2019;Aydin & Østergaard-Nielsen, 2020;Yanasmayan & Kaşlı, 2019;Yener-Roderburg, 2020).…”