Explaining the De Facto Independence of Public Broadcasters

Abstract

Institutions operating beyond direct control of government, such as central banks, constitutional courts and public broadcasters, enjoy guarantees of de jure independence, but de jure independence is no guarantee of de facto independence. This is especially so for public broadcasting, where cultural variables are often assumed to be decisive. In this article, the de jure and de facto independence of thirty-six public service broadcasters world-wide are operationalized, and de jure independence is found to explain a high degree of de facto independence when account is taken of the size of the market for news. Other variables considered in previous literature – such as bureaucratic partisanship and the polarization of the party system – are not found to be significant.

What We Talk About When Talk About “Media Independence”

“…The public media systems in Germany and Nordic countries, for example, are generally considered to enjoy strong de facto independence, while in many other places (e.g. in southern Europe, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand) the procedures for assuring autonomy from governmental control have been seen as increasingly threatened (see, for example, Benson and Powers 2011;Hanretty 2010). Despite different institutional arrangements and their varying success in fostering independence in practice, in scholarly debates public service media have still been regarded, at least in principle, as the institutional space that best approximates the Habermasian ideals of autonomy from both state and commercial pressures (for an overview, for example, Garnham 1986Garnham , 1992Moe and Syvertsen 2009).…”

Comparative Analysis of Risks for Political Independence of Public Service Media Across 19 European Union Member States

“…In line with the ideas put forward by Hanretty (2009) and in line with the MPM2014 study, indicators to assess the independence were divided into de iure, assessing legal framework, and de facto, aiming to assess the extent to which PSM is independent in practice 5 . Hanretty (2009) was among the first ones to raise the question about the connection of the de jure independence, which can be measured by the examination of the legal framework in which a PSM operates, and its actual, de facto independence.…”

“…Indeed, PSM funding and appointment procedures to their board(s) are those mechanisms which are most frequently described as the most important for securing political independence of a PSM (Bardoel and dHaensen, 2008;Benson and Powers,2011;Hanretty, 2009;Papatheodorou and Machin, 2003), and are hence among the most important ones to regularly monitor.…”

“…For example, legislation should clearly outline the appointment and dismissal procedures, contain elements which would minimise state's ability to appoint partisan members, appointments should be made for a specified term, situations in which members can be dismissed should be limited and legally defined etc. In addition, it is suggested that that appointments made for a longer period of time might increase PSM's independence since board members may be less inclined to promote preferences of those that appointed them (Hanretty, 2009). Also, it is speculated that involvement of a larger number of political actors in the appointment process may lead to greater independence since 'the match between any appointing actor and the appointed person will be looser' (Hanretty, 2009: 84).…”

Assessing Formal Independence of Data Protection Authorities in a Comparative Perspective

“…As opposed to what one might assume, the logical link between the two is apparently subject to scientific debate. Whereas Maggetti and Gilardi, in later studies, find out that "formal independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for regulators' de facto independence from political decision-makers and from the regulated industries" [16][17, p. 1], Hanretty, Hayo and Voigt's research suggests a high degree of correlation [18,19].…”