2004
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x
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Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory

Abstract: Terrorism is an extreme, violent response to a failed political process engaging political regimes and ethnic and ideological adversaries over fundamental governance issues. Applying the theory of collective action, the author explains the dynamic of violence escalation and persistence. Recent Islamist terrorism stems from the conviction that a theocracy is the only answer to the multiple problems of Middle Eastern and Muslim countries. Checks on terrorism result both from external social control and from the … Show more

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Cited by 95 publications
(41 citation statements)
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“…Concomitantly, in an article from 1994, bin Laden accused the UN/US forces of being responsible for a conspiracy against the Muslims in Bosnia and for siding with the Serbs in the "ethnic cleansing" of the Muslim Bosnians (Schweitzer and Shay 2003, p. 109). It was this combination of previous US involvement in the Gulf and in Bosnia that made it the primary target for al-Qaeda, part of the increasingly broadening plan for Jihad operations throughout the Muslim world (Katzman 2005;Oberschall 2004;Singerman 2004).…”
Section: Competition For Power Between Movement Actorsmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Concomitantly, in an article from 1994, bin Laden accused the UN/US forces of being responsible for a conspiracy against the Muslims in Bosnia and for siding with the Serbs in the "ethnic cleansing" of the Muslim Bosnians (Schweitzer and Shay 2003, p. 109). It was this combination of previous US involvement in the Gulf and in Bosnia that made it the primary target for al-Qaeda, part of the increasingly broadening plan for Jihad operations throughout the Muslim world (Katzman 2005;Oberschall 2004;Singerman 2004).…”
Section: Competition For Power Between Movement Actorsmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Although defining terrorism remains problematic, one of the most agreed-on dimensions of terrorism is the political nature of this behavior (Schmid and Jongman 1988). In this respect terrorism is, if nothing else, a political strategy and thus the conceptual and analytic tools that have been developed in the field of social movements should be at the center of the study of terrorism (Oberschall 2004;Tilly 2004;della Porta 1995).…”
Section: Petermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mais en noyant celle-ci dans le concept ventre-mou des « ressources » et faute de la travailler pour notamment envisager ses effets dans le temps sur le groupe et le conflit, la RMT verse dans un biais utilitariste et stratégiste. L'attention est plus soutenue ou moins sommaire dans sa seconde mouture, le modèle du processus politique, à la fois par la mise en exergue des contraintes de la structure des opportunités politiques (la « POS ») susceptibles de rendre compte du choix de l'instrument violence et par la perspective diachronique ouverte par la même occasion par Tarrow (1989) 'Oberschall (2004) accorde à la sociologie de l'action collective pour expliquer l'engagement radical, celle-ci souffre de deux biais fondamentaux : l'idée que tout engagement s'équivaut et donc que tous peuvent être analysés avec des outils identiques ; et la négligence pour la dimension microsociologique, associée à tort à une psychologie des acteurs. Contre le premier, Doug McAdam (1986 : 67) distingue fort opportunément l'activisme à faible ou haut coût mesuré en fonction du temps, de l'énergie et de l'argent qu'il suppose, de l'activisme à faible ou haut risque qui, lui, renvoie aux dangers anticipés, de tout ordre (physique, social, légal, financier, etc.)…”
Section: Découvrir La Revueunclassified