Explaining Sub‐Federal Variation in Trade Agreement Negotiations: The Case of CETA

Abstract

Sub‐federal units have emerged as increasingly important actors in international trade policy. This is puzzling as they usually have no formal competencies in this area. Using the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union as a case study, this article examines one key driver behind this development ‐ the provisions in new free trade agreements. The article conceptualizes such provisions as instances of negative and positive integration. We show that while the Canadian provinces largely supported both types of provisions, sub‐federal units in Belgium, Germany and Austria resisted unfettered liberalization through negative integration and market‐creating positive integration. At the same time, they demanded stronger market‐correcting positive integration measures. Three categories of sub‐federal interests explain these differences in motivation. The Canadian province's engagement was motivated by (regional) economic interests, whereas bureaucratic self‐interest and political interests mobilized sub‐federal units in the European federations.

Trade contestation and regional politics: The case of Belgium and Germany

“…Existing studies have focused on the changes in the contents and scope of the trade agenda, whether an agreement is mixed or of EU exclusive competence, on the impact of public opposition toward specific trade policies, and on the expansion of competencies resulting from treaty reforms. By contrast, we draw attention to variation in subnational participation in trade policy to understand the causes and consequences of mobilization, as well as we explain the circumstances that have driven increased politicization among subnational actors in the trade realm (Broschek and Goff, 2022).…”

International practice analysis of the negative list: Chinese Example of shipping market access

“…Like North American Free Trade Agreement 1994 before it, CETA may well become a model for future mega-regional FTAs (de Mestral, 2015). It means the establishment of investment rules between two developed economies, which is of great significance to the development of the international investment legal system (Broschek and Goff, 2022). On the one hand, CETA is the first comprehensive economic and trade agreement signed by the EU with an investment chapter since the Lisbon Treaty was gained the right to make foreign investment policies.…”

Lobbyierende Kantone

“…Gerade in zähen Aushandlungen von Handelsabkommen treten sie zusehends selbstbewusst auf den Plan; sie beanspruchen für sich, als eigenständiger diplomatischer Partner wahrgenommen zu werden, der seine aussen(wirtschafts-)politischen Interessen mit Nachdruck wahrnimmt (vgl. Tatham, 2016Tatham, , 2018bFreudlsperger, 2020;Broschek und Goff, 2022).Was im Ausland gilt, gilt im Inland ebenso: In aller Regel weist das subnationale Recht der Exekutive ausdrücklich die Kompetenz zu, die eigene Entität nach innen und aussen zu vertreten (Auer, 2016, 84;vgl. Beeler et al, 2019).…”

“…Paradiplomatie beschreibt also die diplomatischen Aktivitäten subnationaler Akteure, die parallel zu denjenigen des Bundes erfolgen (Aldecoa und Keating, 1999, 1;vgl. Duchacek, 1986a;Michelmann und Soldatos, 1990;Soldatos, 1990;Freudlsperger, 2020;Broschek und Goff, 2022). Das äussere Vertretungsmonopol des Nationalstaates fiel dahin; der Aufbau, die Pflege sowie die Beendigung diplomatischer Beziehungen ist nicht länger die exklusive Domäne der Bundesebene.…”

“…Trench, 2013, 229-30) (Schnabel, 2020a, 198), trüben sich die Erfolgsaussichten einer eigenständigen Interessenvertretung der einzelnen Kantone. Soldatos, 1990;Soldatos, 1990;Aguirre, 1999;Aldecoa und Keating, 1999;Criekemans und Duran, 2010;Freudlsperger, 2020;Broschek und Goff, 2022). Manchmal koordinieren sie sich mit «ihrem» Nationalstaat; manchmal wagen sie den Alleingang («bypassing»; vgl.…”