Explaining Orbán: A Political Transaction Cost Theory of Authoritarian Populism

Abstract

Based on the theory of transaction cost economics, the paper argues that by vertically organizing political exchange, populist regimes reduce market-type political transaction costs-bargaining, enforcement and information costs-of democracy. However, management-type political transaction costs-organizational costs, partly stemming from corruption-rise as populists in power leverage government control through hierarchically organized clienteles. Transaction cost economics suggest that a shift from democratic towards authoritarian populist regimes occurs when formal and informal political institutions prove unable to maintain horizontal political exchange, and demand for increased government discretion grows. This is demonstrated on Viktor Orbán's authoritarian populist regime in Hungary.

‘The goal is not necessarily to sit at the table’—Resisting autocratic legalism in Hungarian academia

“…In fact, the HAS and CEU are the two institutions mainly responsible for Hungary’s primacy in winning European Research Council grants in CEE (Mátyás & Bőgel, 2019). The fate of the HAS research institute network fits into the general centralising and dirigiste strategy of Orbán's governance affecting almost every public domain and economic sector since 2010 (Ádám, 2019; Csaba, 2019).…”

“Here, the Hungarian people will decide how to raise our children”: Populist rhetoric and social categorization in Viktor Orbán’s anti-LGBTQ campaign in Hungary

“…In the contemporary political context of Hungary, populism has been considered not as a sidelined political style but as an established ideology since Viktor Orbán came to power in 2010 (Scheiring and Szombati, 2020). Thus, Hungary has been labeled as a populist democracy (Pappas, 2014), where populism is an important part of the governing party’s agenda and communication style as the defense and representation of sovereignty against the elite and “others” has been integral to Orbán’s rhetoric (Ádám, 2019; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Visnovitz and Jenne, 2021). Previous research has explored different aspects of the Hungarian government and Orbán’s populist style, studying, for instance, their anti-immigration discourse (Bocskor, 2018), the populist argumentation in the government’s foreign policy (Visnovitz and Jenne, 2021), and the role of Christianity in the prime minister’s populist discourse (Lamour, 2021b).…”

Ultra‐orthodoxy and selective voluntarism: How did the Orbán regime react to the first wave of the pandemic?

“…Viktor Orbán's Hungary, a prime example of authoritarian populism in the European Union (EU) (cf. Ádám, 2019; Ágh, 2016; Bátorfy & Urbán, 2020; Bogaards, 2018; Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018; Buzogány, 2017; Halmai, 2019; Kovács & Trencsényi, 2019; Magyar, 2016), performed fairly well in meeting this challenge in the first wave of the pandemic in the first half of 2020. As comparative data show, infection and death rates remained relatively low during this period.…”