Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy

Koenig‐Archibugi, Mathias

doi:10.1017/s0020818304581055

Cited by 105 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 30 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The first step is to decide on the type of fuzzy-set (continuous or with a limited number of values). To assess better the radical change and regime specific change claims, and because the data permit it, I use continuous fuzzy-sets (Ragin 2000: 158-160;2006b;2008, chapter 5; for applications, see Casario & Dadkhah 1998;Koenig-Archibugi 2004;Vis 2009a). The next step is to select and justify the fuzzy-sets' qualitative breakpoints 0 (fully out of the set) and 1 (fully in the set).…”

Section: Stage Two: Fuzzy-set Ideal Type Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Politics of Risk-taking : Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies

Vis¹

2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Stage Two: Fuzzy-set Ideal Type Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Politics of Risk-taking : Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies

Vis¹

2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The only available empirical study that seeks to explain the variation concludes that federal states are more likely to prefer supranational decisions in external security and defence policies than unitary states (Koenig‐Archibugi, 2004; see also Hooghe, 2001). Thus, domestic institutional features would explain differences in attitudes toward supranationalism in security affairs.…”

Section: Why There Is No Supranational Esdp5mentioning

confidence: 99%

Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign Policy

Risse‐Kappen¹

2012

Global Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One cannot begin to understand EU foreign policy without taking identity politics into account. First, the differential Europeanization of national identities explains to a large degree why the current European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has not been supranationalized. Second, the gap between the EU's grandiose rhetoric of being a 'force for good' in the world and its inability to put this foreign policy identity at work into practice, largely results from the fact that the EU's construction of a distinct foreign policy identity is inward rather than outward-oriented. Last, but not least, the EU enlargement discourse, particularly about Turkey, has as much to do with contested self-descriptions of the EU and what follows for its boundaries than with any security or economic considerations. The article starts with conceptual remarks on collective identity, followed by three case studies focusing on the lack of supranationalization of the ESDP, the EU's foreign policy construction as a civilian power, and the enlargement discourse, particularly with regard to Turkey. I conclude with some policy recommendations. Policy Implications• A 'coalition of the willing' should move ahead towards permanent structured cooperation in foreign and defence matters, irrespective of British objections.• The more the EU pursues a coherent foreign policy with one voice, the more it will recognize that its foreign policy identity and its 'vision for the world' need to be adjusted.• It is more important for European identity creation to pursue a coherent foreign policy than to embark on an identity discourse that cannot be put in practice.• We need more rather than less public controversies about the boundaries of the EU and how these borders reflect European identity.

show abstract

“…The characteristic positionality of European states in relation to their neighbours and the United States should thus determine the willingness to cooperate or not. With regards to political cooperation, some quantitative evidence for this logic has been presented by Koenig-Archibugi (2004). Based on the power-differential model, it is hypothesized that: HYPOTHESIS 3: EU member states with a low power differential in relation to the United States show a high rate of membership in cooperative armaments fora.…”

Section: Power Differentialsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditions of intergovernmental armaments cooperation in Western Europe, 1996–2006

Thiem

2011

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Defence cooperation between Western European countries has increased considerably since the end of the Cold War. An analytical distinction can be made between political and economic cooperation, the latter having been neglected by political scientists. This study advances the debate on economic cooperation by identifying sources of variation in the European Union (EU)-15 countries’ membership rate in cooperative armamentsforaaimed at restructuring the demand side of European defence from 1996 to 2006. By combining six models from three different schools of thought, the risk of confirmation bias through intra-paradigmatic reasoning is reduced. At the same time, fuzzy-set analysis opens up the space for data-driven combination effects. Two distinct combinations form sufficient paths leading to high rates of membership. Most importantly, intentions to create collective defence technological and industrial benefits combine with trust in partners’ ability and integrity to form an essential combination of conditions for governments to pursue cooperation on armaments.

show abstract

Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy

Cited by 105 publications

References 30 publications

Politics of Risk-taking : Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies

Politics of Risk-taking : Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies

Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign Policy

Conditions of intergovernmental armaments cooperation in Western Europe, 1996–2006

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About