Explaining EU-Instruments and Strategies of EU Democracy Promotion. Concluding Remarks

EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring

“…This finding supports the general contention that the EU ultimately prefers regional stability over democracy in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Aliboni 2004;Gillespie and Youngs 2002;Jünemann 2003;Panebianco 2003). This even holds true when asymmetric interdependence in bilateral relations favours the EU, which should give the EU 'bargaining power', providing it with the opportunity to exert pressure without fear of negative repercussions as the target is vulnerable to the EU's demands (Jünemann and Knodt 2007a;Youngs 2009). In response to the Arab Spring, the EU itself admitted failing to get its priorities right in Euro-Mediterranean relations, having succumbed to the fallacy of privileging short-term stability over the long-term prospect of democratization (European Commission and High Representative 2011f; Füle 2011).…”

“…Studies of EU enlargement, external Europeanization, and international democracy promotion have already established the argument that some degree of political liberalization is crucial for the success of international efforts at democracy promotion (Jünemann and Knodt 2007a;Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009;Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). However, these findings usually refer to the distinction between democratic as opposed to authoritarian regimes, or compare nationalist as opposed to reformist governments within already democratic, competitive political systems.…”

“…Theoretically, the dilemma should be more or less pronounced for the EU, depending primarily on the actual risk of destabilization and, secondarily, on the EU's 'leverage' over the targeted regime (Jünemann and Knodt 2007a;Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009;Vachudova 2005). The risk of destabilization varies across countries according to the specific political situation, best captured by the degree of political liberalization and limitations to statehood in the respective target country (Börzel and van Hüllen 2014).…”

“…The 'vulnerability' depends on the size or significance of costs and the availability of alternatives (Keohane and Nye 2001: 10-11), allowing, for example, to compensate for economic sanctions by trading with other actors. In the context of international democracy promotion, dependence is usually analysed in terms of 'western leverage, or the degree to which governments are vulnerable to external democratizing pressure' (Levitsky and Way 2007: 379), directly affecting the external actor's choice of strategy and its success (Jünemann and Knodt 2007a;Youngs 2009). Basically, if one actor is highly dependent, the other can more easily choose a strategy that is likely to bring about its desired outcome.…”

International democracy promotion: a role for public goods theory?

“…Does the promotion of democracy not just for the sake of democracy or democratic peace but to serve the other interests of the democracies itself betoken a sign of weakness? Shallow commitment, in contrast, is perhaps easier to pin down, namely where foreign policy sacrifices democratic goals to the expedient pursuit of vital strategic interests, examples of which in a European context are provided by Youngs (2006) and Jünemann and Knodt (2007). Youngs ' (2006) portrayal of the relatively lukewarm commitment of certain European governments like Spain's and France's may qualify them as free-riders on more active EU member states.…”