Explaining Computation Without Semantics: Keeping it Simple

A revised attack on computational ontology A revised attack on computational ontology Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Fresco, Nir and Staines, Phillip J., "A revised attack on computational ontology" (2014). Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences -Papers: Part A. 2075. https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/2075 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au A revised attack on computational ontology A revised attack on computational ontology Abstract AbstractThere has been an ongoing conflict regarding whether reality is fundamentally digital or analogue.Recently, Floridi has argued that this dichotomy is misapplied. For any attempt to analyse noumenal reality independently of any level of abstraction at which the analysis is conducted is mistaken. In the pars destruens of this paper, we argue that Floridi does not establish that it is only levels of abstraction that are analogue or digital, rather than noumenal reality. In the pars construens of this paper, we reject a classification of noumenal reality as a deterministic discrete computational system. We show, based on considerations from classical physics, why a deterministic computational view of the universe faces problems (e.g., a reversible computational universe cannot be strictly deterministic).Abstract. There has been an ongoing conflict regarding whether reality is fundamentally digital or analogue. Recently, Floridi has argued that this dichotomy is misapplied. For any attempt to analyse noumenal reality independently of any level of abstraction at which the analysis is conducted is mistaken. In the pars destruens of this paper, we argue that Floridi does not establish that it is only levels of abstraction that are analogue or digital, rather than noumenal reality. In the pars construens of this paper, we reject a classification of noumenal reality as a deterministic discrete computational system. We show, based on considerations from classical physics, why a deterministic computational view of the universe faces problems (e.g., a reversible computational universe cannot be strictly deterministic).

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“…Yet, others, including the first author, have argued against the representational view of computation (cf. Fresco, 2010;Piccinini, 2007).…”

Section: Analogicity Digitality and Computationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Revised Attack on Computational Ontology

Fresco

Staines

2013

Minds & Machines

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“…Digital computation (but not computationalism) could be explained without invoking any representational properties (barring internal representations) by appealing to causal or functional properties instead (see Fresco 2010 andPiccinini 2008a). As van Rooij (2008: p. 964) rightly points out, computation and computationalism have become associated with the symbolic tradition, but only sometimes with specific models in this tradition.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Critical Survey of Some Competing Accounts of Concrete Digital Computation

Fresco

2013

Algorithmic Probability and Friends. Bayesian Prediction and Artificial Intelligence

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This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation? Oftentimes, cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ this notion as if there is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to compute. Some cognitive scientists in referring to digital computation simply adhere to Turing computability. But if cognition is indeed computational, then it is concrete computation that is required for explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon. Three accounts of computation are examined here: 1. Formal Symbol Manipulation. 2. Physical Symbol Systems and 3.The Mechanistic account. I argue that the differing requirements implied by these accounts justify the demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of digital computation in regard to physical systems, rather than use these accounts interchangeably. Abstract. This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation? Oftentimes, cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ this notion as if there is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to compute. Some cognitive scientists in referring to digital computation simply adhere to Turing computability. But if cognition is indeed computational, then it is concrete computation that is required for explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon. Three accounts of computation are examined here: 1. Formal Symbol Manipulation. 2. Physical Symbol Systems and 3. The Mechanistic account. I argue that the differing requirements implied by these accounts justify the demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of digital computation in regard to physical systems, rather than use these accounts interchangeably.

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“…In particular, Varela, Thompson, andRosch took computation to require representation (1991/2016, p. 40), and presumably thought that the automaton they described did not meet this requirement. However, more recent accounts of computation do not require representation (see, e.g., Egan 1995;Fresco 2010Fresco , 2014Miłkowski 2011Miłkowski , 2013Piccinini 2007Piccinini , 2015, and so may be compatible with Varela, Thompson, and Rosch's enactive theory of cognition. In this section we will focus on just one of these theories, Piccinini's mechanistic account, and demonstrate that according to this account the enactive automaton described by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch straightforwardly qualifies as a (non-representational) computing mechanism.…”

Section: The Enactive Automaton As a Computing Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism

Dewhurst

Villalobos

2017

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Varela, Thompson, and Rosch illustrated their original presentation of the enactive theory of cognition with the example of a simple cellular automaton. Their theory was paradigmatically anti‐computational, and yet automata similar to the one that they describe have typically been used to illustrate theories of computation, and are usually treated as abstract computational systems. Their use of this example is therefore puzzling, especially as they do not seem to acknowledge the discrepancy. The solution to this tension lies in recognizing a hidden background assumption, shared by both Varela, Thompson, and Rosch and the computational theories of mind which they were responding to. This assumption is that computation requires representation, and that computational states must bear representational content. For Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, representational content is incompatible with cognition, and so from their perspective the automaton that they describe cannot, despite appearances, be computational. However, there now exist several accounts of computation that do not make this assumption, and do not characterize computation in terms of representational content. In light of these recent developments, we will argue that it is quite straightforward to characterize the enactive automaton as a non‐representational computing mechanism, one that we do not think they should have any objections to.

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Explaining Computation Without Semantics: Keeping it Simple

Cited by 22 publications

References 23 publications

A Revised Attack on Computational Ontology

A Revised Attack on Computational Ontology

A Critical Survey of Some Competing Accounts of Concrete Digital Computation

The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism

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