2019
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2019.1631205
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Explaining coherence in international regime complexes: How the World Bank shapes the field of multilateral development finance

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Cited by 32 publications
(39 citation statements)
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References 80 publications
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“…Zhao (Forthcoming), for example, demonstrates that the secretariats of the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety share information and pool expertise to prevent non-compliance by states. Conversely, competition among IO secretariats is typically characterized by rivalry for mandates, members, resources and focality (Lipson 2017;Heldt and Schmidtke 2019), but can also manifest in open conflicts over global policy influence (Morse and Keohane 2014;Hannah et al 2017). Betts (2013:76) argues that regime complexes encourage competition among IOs because institutional proliferation provides states with more choices "in terms of which institutions they could use to address a given problem."…”
Section: Regime Complexes and Iosmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Zhao (Forthcoming), for example, demonstrates that the secretariats of the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety share information and pool expertise to prevent non-compliance by states. Conversely, competition among IO secretariats is typically characterized by rivalry for mandates, members, resources and focality (Lipson 2017;Heldt and Schmidtke 2019), but can also manifest in open conflicts over global policy influence (Morse and Keohane 2014;Hannah et al 2017). Betts (2013:76) argues that regime complexes encourage competition among IOs because institutional proliferation provides states with more choices "in terms of which institutions they could use to address a given problem."…”
Section: Regime Complexes and Iosmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, I demonstrate that IOs are not just part of the architecture of regime complexes, but actors that initiate and undertake their own cross-institutional political strategies in response to decisions taken at other parts of the regime complex. Second, I identify a novel type of IO interaction, intervention, that is distinct from either bureaucratic competition among IOs for mandates, resources and policy influence (Betts 2013;Morse and Keohane 2014;Lipson 2017) or cooperation to achieve joint regulatory goals and/or enhance policy effectiveness and performance (Johnson and Urpelainen 2012;Gehring and Faude 2014;Heldt and Schmidtke 2019). Lastly, I contribute to the literature on IOs as independent actors in global governance by demonstrating three novel political strategies pursued by secretariats in order to influence decision-making not within their own institutions, but at other, overlapping organizations over which they have no formal control.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At the same time, NDB operations will function as a channel for socialization into BRICS approaches to development. However, since the NDB has chosen for substantial partnerships with other parties, including the westerndominated mul tilateral development banks, part of the BRICS socialization function will be diluted [Heldt, Schmidtke, 2019].…”
Section: Brics Outreach Motivationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This paper starts from the premise that the World Bank is a primary candidate to fill this policy leadership role (Heldt and Schmidtke, 2019). It looks at interactions between World Bank engagement (specifically projects by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the Carbon Finance Unit, and the International Finance Corporation) and bilateral aid allocation decisions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%