cholars and laymen alike are constantly intrigued by elite succession, S the changing of the political guard, not simply out of a fascination with power and the powerful, but also because they believe that it makes a difference for society and for themselves. This assumption, however, has largely remained just that-an assumption. The bulk of the scholarly research on the topic has tended to treat succession only as an independent variable; thus, the primary focus has been on issues, such as "who rules" (see, for instance, Beck, 1973), how the rulers rose to power (see, for example, Rustow, 1964; Rush, 1968 Rush, , 1974Burling, 1974;Polsby and Wildavsky, 1971), or how the succession shapes elite values, attitudes, and behavior (Prewitt, 1970; Snowviss, 1966; Seligman, 1971; Brzezinski and Huntington, 1963: 235-268).Howver, considerably less attention has been paid to the equally important linkage (if any) between leadership succession and policy change. In most studies of succession (particularly those of the communist variant), this aspect-the policy impact of succession-is not so much ignored as assumed. This assumption in fact serves as the primary rationale for most studies of succession-China after hlao, for example, is supposed to be somehow "different" from China with hlao (Wang, 1973; Robinson, AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to thank John Echols, lVilliarn Zimnrcriiurri, Zvi Gitelmaii, Grey Hodnett, and Robert Putnani for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to tliank one of the arionyinous reviewers, who made some invaliloble methodological suggestions.