Explaining a new foreign aid recipient: the European Union’s provision of aid to regional trade agreements, 1995–2013

Scott, Brandy Jolliff

doi:10.1057/s41268-018-0163-z

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…RIOs around the globe -including the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) -face challenges related to limited resources. They have increasingly turned to external actors and have accepted considerable amounts of financial and other forms of institutional support (Engel and Mattheis, 2020;Jolliff Scott, 2020). Owing to their relatively broad policy scopes, large membership sizes and long periods of collaboration, ASEAN and CARICOM are more attractive to donors because cooperation with them entails lower transaction costs.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, Hypothesis 4 maintains that RIOs receive more ODA the larger their market size. 4 According to a demand-driven view of external funding, RIOs' attractiveness to donors will vary according to the level of need within the corresponding region (Hoeffler and Outram, 2011;Jolliff Scott, 2020;Lundborg, 1998). From this perspective, RIOs receive external funding when they need to take responsibility for humanitarian relief or stimulate long-term, sustainable economic and social development.…”

Section: Additional Explanations: Market Access Development Concerns ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The dominant standpoint in the scholarly literature maintains that RIOs are driven and shaped ‘from within’ by members-states and intra-regional actors (see Börzel and Risse, 2016; Mattli, 1999). While a growing literature emphasizes the role of external pressures and partners in the promotion of regionalism and RIOs (Buzdugan, 2013; Jolliff Scott, 2020; Katzenstein, 1996; Klose, 2019; Krapohl, 2017; Söderbaum, 2016), knowledge about external funding, which is one of the core instruments that external actors rely on when seeking to influence RIOs from the outside, remains limited.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Whereas country-based bilateral or multilateral aid is allocated to individual states, regional foreign aid provided to a RIO is not ultimately reallocated to a RIO’s individual member-states but instead used to develop the RIO and its constituent bodies or to carry out genuine regional projects. As recipients, RIOs thus need to be treated in a way that is fundamentally different from how the literature on multilateral aid typically treats global intergovernmental organizations (Jolliff Scott, 2020). Accordingly, this study expands the domain of the literature on aid allocation to RIOs while also offering new insights on a type of foreign aid that has increased substantially in recent decades.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Regional international organizations in Africa as recipients of foreign aid: Why are some more attractive to donors than others?

Stapel¹,

Panke²,

Söderbaum³

2023

Cooperation and Conflict

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Foreign aid to regional international organizations (RIOs) has increased tremendously in recent decades. The vast differences between RIOs give rise to the question of why some RIOs attract considerable amounts of aid while others attract much less, or even nothing at all. To address that question, this article sets out and examines a set of hypotheses that focus on various characteristics of RIOs that allow donors to reduce transaction costs. Empirically, the analysis proceeds via two steps: the hypotheses are first subjected to an empirical plausibility probe based on quantitative methods and then illustrated based on case study of the Southern African Development Community. The findings reveal that RIOs are most attractive when they operate in a range of policy fields, involve many member-states and are engaged in long-lasting collaborations with donors. By contrast, there is little support for conventional explanations as to why RIOs attract funding – for instance, claims that being democratic, being most in need or providing donors with market access will lead to greater funding. The rather disturbing policy implication is that a small number of RIOs are likely to continue to attract the bulk of funding, whereas poorly funded RIOs are unlikely to attract significant amounts of aid.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Additional Explanations: Market Access Development Concerns ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Regional international organizations in Africa as recipients of foreign aid: Why are some more attractive to donors than others?

Stapel¹,

Panke²,

Söderbaum³

2023

Cooperation and Conflict

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“…42 We measure the affinity of recipient countries with EU member France as a proxy for the EU. 43 Many studies highlight the tendencies of the EU's powerful countries to use their foreign aid budgets to influence recipient states. 44 Affinity is measured using the yearly s3un measure between France and all recipients.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideas and Interests: European Democracy Aid and the Democracy-Security Dilemma, 1990-2010

Scott¹,

Scott²

2019

All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace

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Since the end of the Cold War, advanced democracies have enacted explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing assistance to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations all over the world. This paper examines the factors shaping European Union democracy aid allocation decisions from 1990-2010, weighing the relative impact of ideational concerns (regime type, human rights) and self-interests (political, security, economic). We argue that EU democracy aid reflects a "democracysecurity dilemma" as the EU balances ideational reasons for promoting democracy with concerns over political and economic relationships, regional stability, and security. We test our hypotheses with a series of random effects, generalized least squares and Heckman selection models, which provide support for our argument. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the impact and explanation of EU democracy promotion policies.selectively: some otherwise similar states receive substantial commitments of democracy aid while others receive little or none. How do aid allocators decide where to commit democracy assistance?To explain the distribution of democracy aid, we argue that donors face a democracysecurity dilemma: ideational reasons for promoting democracy are weighed against political, economic, and security/stability interests, all of which may be threatened by democratization. Not only do some potential democracy aid recipients have relationships and preexisting agreements with donors that advance donor security interests, but situational factors related to recipient political context, conflict, and other matters also influence the desirability, efficacy, and potential consequences of democracy aid. In practice, efforts to promote democratization, develop and sustain friendly neighbors and neighborhoods, build security, and maintain stability are at times at odds. We argue that this dilemma, and its balancing, help to account for the patterns of democracy aid distribution.To test our democracy-security dilemma argument, we examine global European Union (EU) democracy aid allocations from 1990-2010 to examine the democracy-security dilemma and its effects on EU democracy assistance. 3 Specifically, we ask: How has the EU translated the democracy-security dilemma in the practice of democracy aid globally in the 1990-2010 period? Our focus is on EU assistance, not aid from individual EU member states, which is justified for a variety of reasons. Not only is the EU a significant player in global democracy promotion, 4 but EU aid is separate from the foreign aid budgets and decisions of member states. The European Commission is in charge of EU foreign aid: foreign aid priorities and packages are determined by the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development and aid policy-making at the Commission-level is separate from that of member states. 5 Finally, EU democracy aid represents a "hard test" of our democracy-security dilemm...

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European foreign aid to regional organisations in Africa: bullies, overseers, micromanagers and samaritans

Stapel

Söderbaum

2023

Third World Quarterly

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Explaining a new foreign aid recipient: the European Union’s provision of aid to regional trade agreements, 1995–2013

Cited by 3 publications

References 54 publications

Regional international organizations in Africa as recipients of foreign aid: Why are some more attractive to donors than others?

Regional international organizations in Africa as recipients of foreign aid: Why are some more attractive to donors than others?

Ideas and Interests: European Democracy Aid and the Democracy-Security Dilemma, 1990-2010

European foreign aid to regional organisations in Africa: bullies, overseers, micromanagers and samaritans

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