Experiments on Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism

Pinillos, Ángel

doi:10.1002/9781118661666.ch24

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…For yet further worries with pragmatic accounts, see, for example, Pinillos (2012, pp. 203-204), Pinillos andSimpson (2014, p. 39, n. 17), Blome-Tillmann (2013), Petersen (2014), Roeber (2014), Kindermann (2016), Stoutenburg (2016Stoutenburg ( , pp. 2033Stoutenburg ( -2037, and Dinges (2018b).…”

Section: Strength Of the Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Much at stake in knowledge

Dinges

Zakkou

2020

Mind & Language

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Orthodoxy in the contemporary debate on knowledge ascriptions holds that the truth-value of knowledge ascriptions is purely a matter of truth-relevant factors.One familiar challenge to orthodoxy comes from intuitive practical factor effects. But practical factor effects turn out to be hard to confirm in experimental studies, and where they have been confirmed, they may seem easy to explain away. We suggest a novel experimental paradigm to show that practical factor effects exist. It trades on the idea that people retract knowledge attributions when practical factors shift. We also explain why the resulting data raise a serious challenge to orthodoxy.

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Section: Strength Of the Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 Studies using the evidence seeking paradigm yield more robust results. Participants consistently offer higher evidence ratings in the high stakes condition than in the low stakes condition (Pinillos, 2012;Pinillos & Simpson, 2014;Buckwalter & Schaffer, 2015, pp. 208-209;Francis et al, 2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Much at stake in knowledge

Dinges

Zakkou

2020

Mind & Language

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“…For a recent survey of the experimental literature on stakes sensitivity, seePinillos (2016).18 This is noted byFeltz and Zarpentine (2010, fn. 17).…”

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confidence: 91%

“Nobody would really talk that way!”: the critical project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy

Hansen

2018

Synthese

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This paper defends a challenge, inspired by arguments drawn from contemporary ordinary language philosophy and grounded in experimental data, to certain forms of standard philosophical practice. The challenge is inspired by contemporary philosophers who describe themselves as practicing "ordinary language philosophy". Contemporary ordinary language philosophy can be divided into constructive and critical approaches. The critical approach to contemporary ordinary language philosophy has been forcefully developed by Avner Baz, who attempts to show that a substantial chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally misguided. I describe Baz's project and argue that while there is reason to be skeptical of its radical conclusion, it conveys an important truth about discontinuities between ordinary uses of philosophically significant expressions ("know", e.g.) and their use in philosophical thought experiments. I discuss some evidence from experimental psychology and behavioral economics indicating that there is a risk of overlooking important aspects of meaning or misinterpreting experimental results by focusing only on abstract experimental scenarios, rather than employing more diverse and more ecologically valid experimental designs. I conclude by presenting a revised version of the critical argument from ordinary language. Thanks to Emma Borg, Wesley Buckwalter, Kathryn Francis, members of the CCR summer seminar at the University of Reading, participants at the CCCOM Workshop on Communication and Understanding at the University of Stockholm, and three anonymous referees for very helpful comments on versions of this paper. Thanks to Robert Baron, Herb Clark, and Kristen Syrett for permission to reprint figures.

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Experiments on Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism

Cited by 2 publications

References 30 publications

Much at stake in knowledge

Much at stake in knowledge

“Nobody would really talk that way!”: the critical project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy

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