Experimental phenomenology meets brain information processing: Vividness of voluntary imagery, consciousness of the present, and priming.

Abstract

Revisiting the neglected empirical and theoretical work of two pioneers in experimental phenomenology, we tested Enzo Bonaventura's hypothesis that vividness is the intensive variation of the consciousness of the present, and explored a possible generalization of Renata Calabresi's hypothesis that such quale may be linked to the brain's intrinsic cycle of ∼1 s. We tested both hypotheses through experiments using a semantic repetition priming paradigm from the information processing tradition. Participants (N = 81) were asked to read one-/two-noun object descriptions and recall the same target image corresponding to the verbal cue (i.e., apple) following single paired trials in which they were asked to retrieve four types of priming images ( perceptually related, i.e., ball; conceptually related, i.e., banana; perceptually & conceptually related, i.e., orange; and unrelated, i.e., accordion). We found that the most vivid visual mental images for the targets, regardless of prime type, image content, or explicit knowledge of the prime-target relations, occurred between 700 and 1,200 ms-the window of the conscious present hypothesized by Calabresi. Target images occurring within that time-window were faster (positive priming); beyond that interval, however, they were slower (negative priming). The metric extension of the phenomenological experience tied with either positive or negative priming supports a genuine shift in the perception of image duration either as subjective contraction or expansion, respectively. The time-course points to an eventrelated potential signature usually linked with verbally evoked visual imagery (the late positive potential) which warrants further empirical confirmation.

Multidisciplinary Intersections on Artificial-Human Vividness: Phenomenology, Representation, and the Brain

“…Two thousand years later, David Hume described the immediate ideas or images that (within networks of associations) exert a prepotent influence on imagination through poetry and fiction: “The vividness of the first conception diffuses itself along the relations, and is conveyed, as by so many pipes or canals, to every idea that has any communication with the primary one” [ 16 ]. Closer to our days, elaborating further on Brentano’s approach [ 17 ], Meinong reworked Aristotle’s and Hume’s distinction between ideas and impressions (fantasy presentations vs. perceptual presentations [ 16 ]) as intensive gradient of vividness ( Lebhaftigkeit , [ 16 ]), not dependent on content of the underlying representation, but on availability to consciousness in the form of discrete temporary episodes of awareness [ 18 ].…”

“…Arguably, both Brentano and Meinong used vividness intuitively as a natural kind, a primitive notion, and such a perspective was influential and bore fruitful empirical contributions in relation to a particular brand of experimental phenomenology in the early 1900s known as the Graz School of Gestalt Psychology [ 17 ]. Experimental phenomenology is “the study of appearances in subjective awareness” [ 19 ], and it refers to “both a theory and a method derived from, but not identical to, Gestalt psychology” [ 20 ].…”

“…Experimental phenomenology is “the study of appearances in subjective awareness” [ 19 ], and it refers to “both a theory and a method derived from, but not identical to, Gestalt psychology” [ 20 ]. A concept similar to the current notion of vividness— phenomenal salience ( Auffälligkeit )—was central in the experimental phenomenology of Vittorio Benussi [ 21 , 22 ], and of Bonaventura [ 23 ] and Calabresi [ 24 ], who essentially applied Benussi’s ideas in the more specific area of the study of the conscious awareness of the present (see [ 20 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 ]), albeit with different terminology (notably, Benussi’s salience was at times dubbed as “vivacity”, a synonym for vividness, see [ 17 ]).…”

“…Based on an interpretation of, and integration with, Benussi’s salience, it is therefore possible and desirable to attempt a more explicit definition of the current concept of vividness grounded from within experimental phenomenology, since, surprisingly, none of the available phenomenologically-inspired definitions is neither clear nor satisfactory, namely, none goes beyond a vague appeal to a self-evident primitive and intuitive notion which stands on equally ill-defined synonyms (for review see [ 17 ]).…”

Experimental phenomenology, a challenge.

“…In a subsequent issue of this journal, a special section on “What phenomenology tells us about the brain” will present three follow-up articles: one by Iacopo Hachen (in press) on phenomenology and sensory neuroscience, one by Rossana Actis Grosso (2021) on phenomenal permanence, emotions and animacy, and one by Amedeo D’Angiulli and Reeves (in press) on experimental phenomenology and human information processing. And in another issue, a special section on “Color and light phenomena” will present three more follow-up articles: one by Osvaldo da Pos (in press) on psychophysical and phenomenological models of perceptive transparency, one by Baingio Pinna (in press) on the role of contrast polarity from a Gestalt approach, and one by Daniele Zavagno (2021) on the perception of light from a phenomenological perspective.…”