Experimental Evidence for the Existence of an External World

Abstract

Abstract:In this essay I attempt to refute radical solipsism by means of a series of empirical experiments.In the first experiment, I prove to be a poor judge of four-digit prime numbers, in contrast to a seeming Excel program. In the second experiment, I prove to have an imperfect memory for arbitrary-seeming three-digit number and letter combinations, in contrast to my seeming collaborator with seemingly hidden notes. In the third experiment, I seem to suffer repeated defeats at chess. In all three experiments, the most straightforward interpretation of the experiential evidence is that something exists in the universe that is superior in the relevant respects -theoretical reasoning (about primes), memorial retention (for digits and letters), or practical reasoning (at chess) -to my own solipsistically-conceived self. Schwitzgebel & MooreMarch 19, 2013 External World, p. 3 Experimental Evidence for the Existence of an External WorldIt occurs to me to wonder whether the external world exists -that is, whether anything exists other than my own stream of conscious experience. Radical solipsism, I'll say, is the view that my conscious mind is the only thing in the universe; there are no material objects, no other minds, not even a hidden unconscious side of myself. On radical solipsism, this [here I gesture inwardly at my sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences] is all there is, nothing more. I find myself, now, contemplating radical solipsism. I want some sort of evidence or proof of its falsity.You might think -if you exist -that my desire for proof is foolish. You might think it plain that I could never show radical solipsism to be false, that I (and you and we) can only assume that it's false, that any attempt to prove solipsism wrong would inevitably turn in a circle.You might think, with (my seeming memory of) Wittgenstein (1950Wittgenstein ( -1951Wittgenstein ( /1974, that the existence of an external world is an unchallengeable framework assumption necessary for any inquiry to make sense, that it's a kind of philosophical disease to want to rationally refute solipsism, that I might as well hope to establish the validity of logic using no logical assumptions or to prevent my falling through the ice by tugging up on my belt. The historical landscape has been dominated by these two broad approaches. The first approach aims high, hoping to establish with apodictic or deductive or "transcendental"certainty, in a non-question-begging way, that the external world really does exist. The second approach abandons hope of non-question-begging proofs, seeking in one way or another to make us comfortable with their absence. But there is a third approach, historically less influential, thathas not yet, I think, been adequately explored. Its most famous advocate is Bertrand Russell. Russell writes:In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences.... There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in wh...

Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism

“…1 Here and throughout, I employ 'sentient' in a broad way to mean, very roughly, psychology-having. 2 In the literature, 'solipsism' is sometimes used to pick out the weaker view that we do not know that others are conscious, even if they have psychologies (Borge 1999) or the stronger view that the only thing in the universe is your own mind (Schwitzgebel and Moore 2015). 3 In a recent overview, Hyslop (2017) calls discussion of the view "nowadays unfashionable."…”