Experimental comparison of two multiple-stage contest designs with asymmetric players

Chark, Robin; Rapoport, Anatol; Zwick, Rami

doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9631-8

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 40 publications

(30 reference statements)

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“…18 There are, however, several e¤ects that could cause e¤ort to be dependent on the process of alliance formation. First, there could be a psychological e¤ect of a conscious choice to form an alliance that is absent in the model outlined in appendix A.1.…”

Section: Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Group Formation in Experimental Contests

2012

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We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We …nd that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending e¤ort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower e¤ort. Anticipation of this exploitation may explain their preference to stand alone.JEL codes: D72, D74

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Section: Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Group Formation in Experimental Contests

2012

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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

2014

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Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multibattle contests. Then we review research on sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, and contests between groups, as well as real-effort and field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests to the study of legal systems, political competition, war, conflict avoidance, sales, and charities, and suggest directions for future research.

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