“…Hayashi [1993Hayashi [ , 2000, Tayhindro [1997], de Lone [1998], De La Fayette [1998], Boyle [1999], Barston [1999], Churchill [1999], Maric [2001], Agorau [2000a, 2000b], Molenaar [2000], Valencia [2000] and Ellis [2001]. The economics literature has explored the behavior of nation states from a game-theory perspective, Clark [1980], Kaitala [1986], Kaitala and Pohjola [1998], McKelvey [1997], Bjorndal et al [1998], Datta and Mirman [1999], Lindroos and Kaitala [2000] and McKelvey et al [2002], and issues ranging from incomplete markets, externalities, nonmarket values and property rights, Kennedy and Pasternak [1991], Thebaud [1997], Aston [1999], Gazelius [1999], Polacheck et al [1999], Stokke [2000], Campbell et al [2000] and Grafton et al [2000]. These provide the foundations for explaining complicated multinational negotiations that have been established to reach agreement on management of transboundary fish stocks.…”