Expectations and Decisions in the Volunteer’s Dilemma: Effects of Social Distance and Social Projection

Abstract

In a Volunteer’s Dilemma (VoD) one individual needs to bear a cost so that a public good can be provided. Expectations regarding what others will do play a critical role because they would ideally be negatively correlated with own decisions; yet, a social-projection heuristic generates positive correlations. In a series of 2-person-dilemma studies with over 1,000 participants, we find that expectations are indeed correlated with own choice, and that people tend to volunteer more than game-theoretic benchmarks and their own expectations would allow. We also find strong evidence for a social-distance heuristic, according to which a person’s own probability to volunteer and the expectation that others will volunteer decrease as others become socially more remote. Experimentally induced expectations make opposite behavior more likely, but respondents underweight these expectations. As a result, there is a small but systematic effect of over-volunteering among psychologically close individuals.

Social Perception in the Volunteer's Dilemma: Role of Choice, Outcome, and Expectation

“…We suggest that rational interests, including loss-aversion, reputation management, and coordination signaling, combine to explain why so many people choose to volunteer. Because defection is viewed unfavorably relative to volunteering overvolunteering can occur, particularly among individuals who are socially close (Krueger et al, 2016). Overvolunteering (i.e., mutual volunteering) is a Type I error or wasted investment, whereas undervolunteering (mutual defection) is a Type II error or missed opportunity to do good (Heck & Krueger, 2015;Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000).…”

“…People use a variety of strategies to choose between cooperation and defection (Krueger, Heck, & Wagner, in revision) and rates of volunteering can be high, even to the point of inefficiency (Krueger et al, 2016;Murnighan, Kim, & Metzger, 1993;Przepiorka & Diekmann, 2013). Ideally, a player picks whichever strategy the other is not taking.…”

“…When both cooperate, they achieve Pareto efficiency, that is, the highest possible sum of payoffs. In contrast, the VoD poses the risk of overvolunteering because the summed payoffs of two volunteers are lower than what would be obtained if one person defected (Murnighan et al, 1993;Krueger et al, 2016). The VoD shares this characteristic with the game of chicken (or hawk-dove game, Rapoport & Chammah, 1966).…”

“…Just one person needs to drive to the pizza shop so that everyone enjoys the meal, and only one designated driver is needed for a small group to enjoy a night out. The framing of the payoffs as gains or losses does not affect the structure of the game, and its impact on decision-making appears to be limited, although it is not nothing (Krueger, Ullrich, & Chen, 2016).…”

Confidence in uncertainty: Error cost and commitment in early speech hypotheses

“…The Bayesian rationale for this is that one’s own behaviour is a reasonable starting point for forming expectations [ 90 ]. In fact, one’s own behaviour is the only available data in anonymous one-shot social decisions [ 91 ]. The bar scenario is a brief, goal oriented social interaction whose participants typically do not know each other but they share prior knowledge about the situation.…”