Exit from Hegemony

Abstract

We live in a period of uncertainty about the fate of American global leadership and the future of international order. The 2016 election of Donald Trump led many to pronounce the death, or at least terminal decline, of liberal international order—the system of institutions, rules, and values associated with the American-dominated international system. But the truth is that the unraveling of American global order began over a decade earlier. Exit from Hegemony develops an integrated approach to understanding the rise and decline of hegemonic orders. It calls attention to three drivers of transformation in contemporary order. First, great powers, most notably Russia and China, contest existing norms and values while simultaneously building new spheres of international order through regional institutions. Second, the loss of the “patronage monopoly” once enjoyed by the United States and its allies allows weaker states to seek alternative providers of economic and military goods—providers who do not condition their support on compliance with liberal economic and political principles. Third, transnational counter-order movements, usually in the form of illiberal and right-wing nationalists, undermine support for liberal order and the American international system, including within the United States itself. Exit from Hegemony demonstrates that these broad sources of transformation—from above, below, and within—have transformed past international orders and undermine prior hegemonic powers. It provides evidence that all three are, in the present, mutually reinforcing one another and, therefore, that the texture of world politics may be facing major changes.

The Pandemic and the Transformation of Liberal International Order

“…Cooley and Nexon’s assessment further demonstrates that the unravelling of American hegemony was already underway before Trump’s presidency. Trump only sped up America’s retreat in the liberal international order [ 23 ]. Moreover, the doubt cast on America’s leadership by its allies in Europe, the loss of “a vision of how the world is supposed to work”, and the challenge from internal fragmentation all contributed to “the eclipse of the West” [ 24 ].…”

“…However, because of the ideological divergence, authoritarian political-economic models built by these two countries are increasingly welcomed by sitting dictators and emerging autocrats. China and Russia have already become alternative providers of goods such as developmental assistance and military security, which used to be monopolized by major Western powers [ 23 ]. Now, they are using such leverages to rival the liberal order led by the United States, building “parallel structures of global governance that are dominated by authoritarian states and that compete with older, more liberal structures” [ 65 ].…”

(No) Exit from liberalism?

“…One is a commitment to sovereign equality: that differences in military or economic power should not translate into de facto or de jure interstate hierarchy. The other is a preference for specific kinds of ordering infrastructure: “multilateral treaties and agreements, international organizations, and institutions that make rules and norms, monitor compliance with those rules and norms, resolve disputes, and provide for public, private, and club goods” (Cooley and Nexon, 2020: 22–23).…”

“…It seems pretty clear that significant slices of contemporary international order—in various regions and policy domains—reflect at least some politically liberal principles, norms, and arrangements. World politics is “dense with treaties, agreements, [and] covenants…that bakes in politically liberal principles.” These include a range of arrangements from the Geneva Conventions to the United Nations Charter, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Cooley and Nexon, 2020: 21). Lynchpin regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the EU, affirm commitments to democratic principles and liberal rights.…”

“…Third, different dimensions of liberalism often work at cross purposes. For instance, intergovernmentalism can create “barriers to the spread of political and economic liberalism.” When “it privileges sovereign equality, it makes it difficult to pressure illiberal states to reform” and “restricts the ability of states to impose liberal governance unilaterally, including through force” (Cooley and Nexon, 2020: 51).…”