Exit Duty Generator

Häyry, Matti

doi:10.1017/s096318012300004x

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 21 publications

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“…The concept is elusive, but it is easy to agree that the frustration of important needs is prima facie wrong while the satisfaction of important needs is prima facie right. One and the same action can, of course, lead to need satisfaction for some and need frustration for others, but this is not an issue in considering possible-future-child-regarding reasons not to reproduce [23].…”

Section: We Do Havementioning

confidence: 99%

Procreative Generosity: Why We Should Not Have Children

Häyry

2023

Philosophies

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We should not have children because (i) we have no child-regarding reasons to do so, (ii) we have child-regarding reasons not to do so, and (iii) although we have other-regarding reasons to do so, these reasons are not decisive. Objections to (i) include that life is always good and that possible individuals would choose life if given the opportunity. These fail if there is no duty to create even a good life (the argument from asymmetry), all lives are bad (the argument from quality of life), and potential parents are not entitled to produce lives without the permission of the offspring (the argument from assumed consent). The failure of the objections is not, however, self-evidently inevitable if a hedonistic axiology is used. It becomes inevitable with a switch to an autonomy-respecting, need-based theory of value. There is no need to become existent (i), and there is a need to avoid frustration, pain, and suffering once an individual has been brought into existence (ii). Since any life can be or turn out to be very bad, potential parents put their children in harm’s way by creating them (the argument from risk). To see this and to see how the preferences of the potential parents do not change the situation (iii), it is necessary to assume a concept of gambling that allows genuinely serious harm in case the player loses.

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Section: We Do Havementioning

confidence: 99%

Procreative Generosity: Why We Should Not Have Children

Häyry

2023

Philosophies

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Let the Chips Fall! Public Nudging Arrangements, Coercion, and the Role of Independent Shopkeepers

Häyry

Ahola-Launonen

Takala

2023

Soc

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Nudging, according to its inventors and defenders, is supposed to provide a non-coercive way of changing human behavior for the better—a freedom-respecting form of “libertarian paternalism.” Its original point was to complement coercive modes of influence without any need of justification in liberal frameworks. This article shows, using the example of food-product placement in grocery stores, how this image is deceptive. Although nudging practices may not restrict the freedom of consumers, nudging arrangements by public health authorities do restrict the freedom of shopkeepers in standard liberal senses. Libertarianism cannot justify this coercion, and the creed is best left out of the equation as the ideological ruse that it, in this discussion, is. Other liberal theories can justify the coercion, but on grounds that can also be applied to other methods of public health promotion by subsidies and regulation. This result reaffirms that nudging should be seen to complement, not to replace, those other methods.

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Antinatalism, Extinction, and the End of Procreative Self-Corruption

Häyry,

Sukenick

2024

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This Element provides an exploration of antinatalism, the view that assigns a negative value to reproduction. First, the history of Western philosophy as a two-and-a-half millennia reaction to antinatalist sentiments. Human life has no obvious meaning and philosophers have been forced to build elaborate theories to invent imaginary purposes. Second, analysis of the concept of antinatalism in the light of human extinction. If people stop having children, the species will cease to exist, and this prospect has prompted attempts to find alternatives and excuses. Third, outlines a normative view defending antinatalism both theoretically and practically. If it is wrong to bring about suffering in the absence of redeeming meaning and if it is possible to create meaning only by imposing a pronatalist mentality upon children before they can make up their own minds, parents morally corrupt themselves by procreating. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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Exit Duty Generator

Cited by 6 publications

References 21 publications

Procreative Generosity: Why We Should Not Have Children

Procreative Generosity: Why We Should Not Have Children

Let the Chips Fall! Public Nudging Arrangements, Coercion, and the Role of Independent Shopkeepers

Antinatalism, Extinction, and the End of Procreative Self-Corruption

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