Existential Theodicy as a Response to the Limits of Classic Theodicy on the Basis of Kierkegaard’s Religious Writings

Abstract

The aim of this article is to reconstruct an existential vision of theodicy from the religious writings of Kierkegaard – one which could constitute a response to the limits of classic theodicy. As distinct from classic theodicy, which has an immanent and theoretical dimension, Kierkegaard’s considerations take a transcendent and practical form. Good and evil are not here objective and moral markers of a human’s life, but first and foremost determine the subjective and spiritual relationship of a human being with God. With this transcendent and spiritual account of good and evil it becomes possible to revalue their immanent vision and to show that what people consider good and evil in temporality constitutes not ultimate reality, but the possibility for spiritual reality – one in which what is ultimately good and evil for a human being is only decided in relation to God. Kierkegaard’s transcendent account of evil on the one hand provides a clear explanation of the problem of evil and suffering in the world, and on the other hand points out to the relativity of all immanent attempts to answer this question.

Thankfulness: Kierkegaard’s First-Person Approach to the Problem of Evil

“…If I am not mistaken, Leibniz, from Kierkegaard's point of view, does not fall victim to criticism through recourse to teleological ideas per se, but because he wrongly presumes to be able to demonstrate their validity in a purely philosophical way or as a priori rational. 6 Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms argue or polemicize unanimously against this presumption and vote-nota bene: also from a purely philosophical perspective-in favor of a consistent agnosticism with regard to teleology. 7 If, on the other hand, they themselves invoke teleological patterns of thinking, 8 then it is by consciously switching to a religious perspective, and by recommending such a switch to their readers also.…”

“…SKS 4, 249/PF, 44 (my emphasis): 'Socrates, who did indeed advance what is called the physico-teleological demonstration for the existence of God ... constantly presupposes [forudsaetter] that the god exists, and on this presupposition he seeks to infuse nature with the idea of fitness and purposiveness [Hensigtmaessighedens Tanke] ... At the god's request, he casts out his net, so to speak, to catch the idea of fitness and purposiveness, for nature itself comes up with many terrifying devices and many subterfuges in order to disturb'. 12 This is Slowikowski's term [6]; it corresponds to the claim that Kierkegaard's entire 'theodicy-project' rests upon a fundamental premise: the premise, namely, that the idea of 'spirit' as an essential possibility and mode of being (human) makes sense ( [6], pp. 216 and 218).…”

“…The 'existential' character of Kierkegaard's theodicy and its transformation into the first-person perspective of the individual before God is also emphasized, each in its own way, by [2], p. 58, [6] and [12]. The fact that the reflection on the (factual and/or possible) suffering of others can be or become a component of and a reason for one's own suffering, while at the same time both dimensions can and must be distinguished in theory, shall be addressed separately, with a somewhat critical intention in mind, in Section 4.…”