Executive functions in motor imagery: support for the motor-cognitive model over the functional equivalence model

Glover, Scott; Bibby, Elys; Tuomi, Elsa

doi:10.1007/s00221-020-05756-4

Cited by 45 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…Furthermore, the functional equivalence perspective predicts little difference in neural activity between motor simulation and action execution or systematic timing errors (Glover & Baran, 2017 ). Because we have found clear differences between the simulation conditions studied in the present study, our data may provide further support aligned with the growing behavioral, neurophysiological, and conceptual evidence for the motor cognitive model of motor simulation, rather than functional equivalence (Glover et al., 2020 ).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 84%

A neural signature for combined action observation and motor imagery? An fNIRS study into prefrontal activation, automatic imitation, and self–other perceptions

et al. 2022

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Introduction: Research indicates that both observed and imagined actions can be represented in the brain as two parallel sensorimotor representations. One proposal is that higher order cognitive processes would align these two hypothetical action simulations. Methods:We investigated this hypothesis using an automatic imitation paradigm, with functional near-infrared spectroscopy recordings over the prefrontal cortex during different motor simulation states. On each trial, participants (n = 14) observed a picture of a rhythmical action (instructed action) followed by a distractor movie showing the same or different action. Participants then executed the instructed action. Distractor actions were manipulated to be fast or slow, and instructions were manipulated during distractor presentation: action observation (AO), combined action observation and motor imagery (AO+MI) and observe to imitate (intentional imitation). A pure motor imagery (MI) condition was also included.Results: Kinematic analyses showed that although distractor speed effects were significant under all instructions (shorter mean cycle times in execution for fast compared to slow trials), this imitation bias was significantly stronger for combined AO+MI than both AO and MI, and stronger for intentional imitation than the other three automatic imitation conditions. In the left prefrontal cortex, cerebral oxygenation was significantly greater for combined AO+MI than all other instructions. Participants reported that their representation of the self overlapped with the observed model significantly more during AO+MI than AO. Conclusion:Left prefrontal activation may therefore be a neural signature of AO+MI, supporting attentional switching between concurrent representations of self (MI, topdown) and other (AO, bottom-up) to increase imitation and perceived closeness.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 84%

A neural signature for combined action observation and motor imagery? An fNIRS study into prefrontal activation, automatic imitation, and self–other perceptions

et al. 2022

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“…It is possible that when playing music in one's head, there is the luxury to pause or dwell on a particular moment. Because imagery involves additional mechanisms of generation and maintenance as well executive processes (Glover et al, 2020), this could lengthen processing, without apparently increasing the cognitive workload compared to actually listening (Figure 4).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental Effort When Playing, Listening, and Imagining Music in One Pianist’s Eyes and Brain

Endestad

Godøy

Sneve

et al. 2020

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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We investigated "musical effort" with an internationally renowned, classical, pianist while playing, listening, and imagining music. We used pupillometry as an objective measure of mental effort and fMRI as an exploratory method of effort with the same musical pieces. We also compared a group of non-professional pianists and non-musicians by the use of pupillometry and a small group of non-musicians with fMRI. This combined approach of psychophysiology and neuroimaging revealed the cognitive work during different musical activities. We found that pupil diameters were largest when "playing" (regardless of whether there was sound produced or not) compared to conditions with no movement (i.e., "listening" and "imagery"). We found positive correlations between pupil diameters of the professional pianist during different conditions with the same piano piece (i.e., normal playing, silenced playing, listen, imagining), which might indicate similar degrees of load on cognitive resources as well as an intimate link between the motor imagery of sound-producing body motions and gestures. We also confirmed that musical imagery had a strong commonality with music listening in both pianists and musically naïve individuals. Neuroimaging provided evidence for a relationship between noradrenergic (NE) activity and mental workload or attentional intensity within the domain of music cognition. We found effort related activity in the superior part of the locus coeruleus (LC) and, similarly to the pupil, the listening and imagery engaged less the LC-NE network than the motor condition. The pianists attended more intensively to the most difficult piece than the non-musicians since they showed larger pupils for the most difficult piece. Non-musicians were the most engaged by the music listening task, suggesting that the amount of attention allocated for the same task may follow a hierarchy of expertise demanding less attentional effort in expert or performers than in novices. In the professional pianist, we found only weak evidence for a commonality between subjective effort (as rated measure-by-measure) and the objective effort gauged with pupil diameter during listening. We suggest that psychophysiological methods like pupillometry can index mental effort in a manner that is not available to subjective awareness or introspection.

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“…The results of experiment 4 suggested MI priming does not reflect increased motorcognitive load. At first glance this contradictsGlover & Baran's (2017;Glover et al, 2020) motor-cognitive model (MCM) of MI. The MCM was motivated by the finding that although MI performance generally adheres to biomechanical constraints of the body (de Lange et al,…”

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confidence: 97%

“…Although this is a useful heuristic for researchers investigating commonalities between MI and action proper, FE and the related neural simulation theory (Jeannerod, 2001) may be unsuitable for understanding mechanisms that are unique to MI (Glover & Baran, 2017;O'Shea & Moran, 2017). Accumulated behavioral and neural evidence demonstrates differences between MI and action that reflects this problem (Glover et al, 2020;Hanakawa et al, 2008;Ingram et al, 2019;Kranczioch et al, 2009Kranczioch et al, , 2010Lebon et al, 2019;Solomon et al, 2019). To examine the FE hypothesis in more detail, in this article we present a series of behavioral experiments which directly compare the effects of MI and MP on priming subsequent actions in an S1-S2 response priming paradigm.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Functional equivalence revisited: Costs and benefits of priming action with motor imagery and motor preparation.

Toovey

Seiss

Sterr

2021

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor

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The functional equivalence (FE) hypothesis suggests motor imagery (MI) is comparable with the planning stages of action. A strong interpretation of this hypothesis suggests MI can prime subsequent actions in a way that should be indistinguishable from motor preparation (MP). Alternatively, MI could involve more richly informative motor plans than MP, producing different effects on the performance of subsequent actions. Although past research has demonstrated MI can prime action, little research directly compared it to MP, thus the value of strong FE interpretations for understanding MI remains unclear. In the present study, a pre-cueing paradigm was used in four experiments, and congruency effects were compared. Precues could either prepare participants for specific responses (MP condition) or participants should imagine the precued response (MI condition), prior to making their response. Experiment 1 provided first evidence favouring our alternative hypothesis that predicted imagery-primed responses result in larger response priming effects than prepared-responses, meaning that it might involve more richly informative motor plans than preparation for action. Experiment 2 manipulated precueimperative stimulus foreperiods and replicated this effect, showing it to be independent of potential temporal uncertainty differences between the two conditions. Experiment 3 showed the effect is present in both foot and finger responses, and experiment 4 suggested the larger congruency effects in the MI condition cannot be explained by differences in cognitive load. These results suggest that the strong FE hypothesis does not hold. Findings are discussed in line with the predictive processing models of action and MI. Public Significance Statement:Motor imagery is a promising tool for neurorehabilitation, so a better understanding of how motor imagery works is becoming increasingly important as a result. This work shows that motor imagery can influence subsequent action to a greater extent than preparation for action alone. This evidence provides a new and meaningful development to the functional equivalence hypothesis.

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Executive functions in motor imagery: support for the motor-cognitive model over the functional equivalence model

Cited by 45 publications

References 54 publications

A neural signature for combined action observation and motor imagery? An fNIRS study into prefrontal activation, automatic imitation, and self–other perceptions

A neural signature for combined action observation and motor imagery? An fNIRS study into prefrontal activation, automatic imitation, and self–other perceptions

Mental Effort When Playing, Listening, and Imagining Music in One Pianist’s Eyes and Brain

Functional equivalence revisited: Costs and benefits of priming action with motor imagery and motor preparation.

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